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ABSTRACT
THE PATH TO VICTORY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MENA
REGION COUNTRIES
Negar Moayed
Old Dominion University, 2020
Director: Dr. Peter Schulman

During the “Arab Spring” the Arab world witnessed a wave of uprisings. As a result of
these anti-government movements, four governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were
overthrown, three governments of Bahrain, Jordan, and to some points Saudi Arabia were faced
with critical difficulties, and one government ,Syria, experienced domestic war. All these
happened while some other Middle Eastern countries remained stable. Yet, the remaining
questions are: how did these protests emerge? How was the collective identity which is essential
for the social movements created? Why were some of these movements successful in
overthrowing the regime while the others failed? What factors were involved in the success or
failure of these social movements? In order to answer these questions this study reviews the
mainstream theories of social movements to examine whether any of these theories are
applicable to the case of MENA and whether they can explain the reason behind the formation of
movements. This research argues that the traditional theories of social movements fall short in
explaining the chaos in the MENA region as well as the reasons behind the formation of
uprisings. Accordingly, by in depth analysis of three case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain
and through comparing different involved countries in the Arab Spring, this study introduces
four existing challenges in the MENA region. Later by defining relevant sub-categories for each
challenge, institutional factors, facilitators, and determiners are recognized. Finally, by defining a
model, this study claims that the first three challenges, secularism/Islamism, economic, and

ethnic/tribal division are the reason behind the formation of social movements of MENA and the
last challenge, administrative, sheds light on the variation of outcome of the movements in this
region
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The timeline between 2010 and 2014 was equal to the emergence of many protests in
thousands of cities around the world. There have been some movements and protests in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) which led to the transformation in countries like Tunisia
and Egypt and some others could not achieve their main demands like in Bahrain, Yemen, and
Libya. There has been a long and difficult history of the struggles of the Arab-majority countries
regarding a more responsive and involved governance. However, the mutual point in all of them
was pushing back the citizen’s demands, sometimes even with brutality. Eventually, despite all
the fears and obstacles, dissatisfaction of the people with the governments, reached a point where
people started to occupy the streets and shout for change.
While the demands were not the same, thousands of people occupied the streets to call for
political change in their countries. Some protests were against the denationalization of public
services, some demanded higher budgets on social services, and less taxation, while in the
majority of the movements in the MENA region the main demand was a complete transformation
of the country’s political system and democracy.
Soon after, the social movements in MENA have become so popular among the
politicians and analysts both domestically and internationally. Moreover, the so-called Arab
Spring’s domino effect had some long-term impacts on the MENA countries. The active
presence or electoral success of Islamic extremism in some of these countries (e.g., Syria and
Libya) has made some politicians much worried about the political perspective of the region that
they even often reference these movements as the “Arab Winter” instead of the “Arab Spring”.
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The importance of this topic has resulted from the fact that after the Islamic Revolution
of Iran in 1979, the MENA region had not experienced any mass protests until the emergence of
the Arab Spring and the Green movement in Iran. Further, even picturing any dramatic political
and social transformations were hard and far-reaching for the people of the region and the
foreign observers. However, with the emergence of these movements, all the previous
assumptions collapsed 1.
After the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, the Arab Spring and the Green Movement
were the main anti-government protests and rebellions that spread across the Middle East in late
2010. The Green Movement, which was one of the important contemporary movements in the
Middle East, happened in Iran because of the fraudulent presidential election in 2009. In the
beginning, Iranian people’s main concern in the protests was the outcome of the election. Later,
the nature of the movement, slogans, and demands changed dramatically. People were no more
concerned only about their votes but called for a reformation. The regime started to confront the
crowd, the military got involved and the government started to use force and suppression. Many
people died, and two main candidates along many activists, journalists, and protesters got
imprisoned 2.
Most of the scholars in the field believe that the main demand of the contemporary
movements in MENA is democracy. This variable is common among all the protest movements
from Egypt and Tunisia to Yemen and Bahrain. Accordingly, this demand is what differentiates
these movements from the 20th century movements. The 20th century movements were mostly

1

Kurzman, C. (2012). The Arab spring: Ideals of the Iranian green movement, methods of the Iranian
revolution. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 44(1), 162-165.
2

Rabiei, Kamran. "Protest and Regime Change: Different Experiences of the Arab Uprisings and the 2009 Iranian
Presidential Election Protests." International Studies 57, no. 2 (2020): 144-170.
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related to Nationalism, Marxism, or had religious roots. None of these movements called for
democracy as their first demand. However, this is the main feature of the contemporary
movements in MENA.3.
For instance, while the Green Movement at the beginning emerged because of the
fraudulent election and was against the official announced result, later it demanded political,
social, economic, and technological reformations. People started to demand reformation of the
current status quo and moving towards a more pleasant situation with emphasizing a free, fair,
and healthy election. The Green Movement was not just an electoral movement but a contentious
movement against the lies, deceptions, inefficiencies, and authoritarianism backed into the
regime. Based on the formal calculations and power’s definition, the Green Movement was a
failed social movement. However, it is possible to argue that the Green Movement has not been a
failure, because it has been remained and sustained itself in other lively and dynamic forms 4.
Although many scholars believe that these movements have failed, it looks like that MENA
social movements appear different from the classic social movements in the US and Europe.
Ten years have passed from the emergence of the Green Movement, the social,
contentious movement that emerged during the 2009 presidential elections and formed a coup.
Its leaders are still imprisoned and the administration despite all the protests and objections
which took a long time to process, remained on till the end of the legal period. Although the
Arab spring or the Green Movement might not be successful in achieving their demands, they
have initiated shaping a new era of political change. Therefore, in a world where social

3
Elseewi, T. A. (2011). The Arab Spring| A Revolution of the Imagination. International Journal of
Communication, 5, 10.
4

Kurzman, C. (2012). The Arab Spring: Ideals of the Iranian Green Movement, methods of the Iranian
Revolution. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 44(1), 162-165.
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movements have been and continued to be important drivers of political change, it is necessary to
have a more thorough understanding of the political outcomes and consequences of the social
movements 5.
This dissertation is motivated by two research questions. what is the reason behind the
emergence of these contemporary movements and how these protests emerged? What factors
were involved in creation of various outcomes and the success or failure of these social
movements? For answering these questions, I study the mainstream theories of social movements
to see whether any of the classic and new social movements theories are applicable to the social
movements of MENA?
The literature regarding the questions about “how” and “why” social movements emerge
is so rich. However, the political outcomes of the social movements are what the scholars have
begun to study in the past two decades. The point is, it is not easy to examine whether the
political outcome is the result of the particular social movement or of other factors within a
specific context, during a particular time frame have caused that outcome. Accordingly, the
political outcome would not be the same in any states with different political system, context,
and another time frame What is obvious is that social movements would provide the population
with valuable experiences even if they might not achieve the exact demand at the time.
Demands for democracy, lack of economic development, lack of social justice, bad
governance, political repression, social class division, youth and women status, and social media
are all variables that were involved in the emergence of movements in MENA 6. However, the

5

Tilly, C. (2017). From mobilization to revolution. In Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and Social
Change (pp. 71-91). Routledge.
6

Bakshian, Aram. "Eyes and Ears of the Arab Spring." (2012): 85-90.
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level of their impact and the way that governments react to these movements and protests, and
the form of dispute were not similar in the studied countries in MENA7.
I begin the dissertation by reviewing the mainstream theories of social movements and
new social movement theories which I believe is necessary in order to have a broader perspective
regarding the social movements of MENA. In chapter 2, by applying these theories to the case of
MENA I discuss the incapability of the traditional and new social movement theories in
explaining the dynamics of contemporary social movements in MENA in terms of the
differences in the political context, the magnitude of mobilization potentials, organizational
characteristics, and action orientation.
There is a vast amount of both theoretical and empirical literature on social movements.
There are many scholarly debates on the theories of social movements and the consequences of
social movements. The mainstream theories of social movements are the ones that emerged in
the United States and Europe during the 70-80s. These theories were created to explain the
classical movements like civil rights, national student liberation, and anti-war movements 8.
Each of these movements had an agenda, they were all politically oriented, and moreover,
they all originated to progress towards democracy. For instance, in Europe, the new social
movement theories which emerged because of the student movement of 1968, environmental,
ecological, and feminist movements took a path that was non-class and new in terms of political

7

Bosi, Lorenzo, and Katrin Uba. "Introduction: the outcomes of social movement." Mobilization 14 (2009): 409415.
8

Russell, Adrienne. "The Arab Spring| Extra-National Information Flows, Social Media and the 2011 Egyptian
Uprising." International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 10.
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and social logic. The new avenue was directed at addressing what was believed to be the absence
in classical Marxism, namely a tendency toward economic and class reductionism 9.
The dominant theory used in studying social movements in the United States is Resource
Mobilization Theory (RMT), with the focus on economic factors and resources for collective
actions. This theory seeks to examine, in the presence of political opportunities, how actors
recognize the opportunities and initiate actions 10. Later, with the development of social
movement theories, scholars shift the focus from material resources and humans to the political
environment. The best known of these theories is the Political Process Theory (PPT). According
to this theory, that provides an opportunity for collective actions is the opening of political
opportunities and structural factors, such as factors that are stable and are outside of the control
of movement actors 11.
In chapter 3, I review the historical context of the Middle East and explain the nature of
MENA movements which is the reason behind the necessity of a new model or theory for
explaining the MENA movements. I argue that the factor which prevents formation of real and
peaceful social movement in MENA like the rest of the world is lack of democracy. Thus, in
chapter 5, I discuss the obstacles to democracy which is the reason behind the difference between
the MENA movements and other social movements. In chapter 6, I study three case studies, the
successful cased of Tunisia and Egypt along the failed case of Bahrain by help of four main
present challenges in the Middle East. By reviewing these challenges, I offer an analytical

9

Buechler, S. M. (1995). New social movement theories. Sociological Quarterly, 36(3), 441-464.
Tarrow, S. G. (2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge University
Press.
10

11

Foran, John, ed. A century of revolution: social movements in Iran. Vol. 2. U of Minnesota Press, 1994.
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approach in chapter 7, that explains all the impactful factors for formation of social movements
in MENA region.
Based on all the impactful variables on the formation of social movements in the region
and the present challenges, I suggest a model in chapter 8 which is capable to explain the social
movements of MENA. Later, in this chapter I argue that the first three challenges are the reason
behind the formation of the social movements in MENA. Accordingly, the fourth challenge and
its subcategory which are three factors can help us to define the variation of the outcome,
success, or failure of a movement in MENA.
In chapter 9, the conclusion, I endeavor to make several contributions by discussing the
various scenarios which the presence or absence of these three variables could cause and answer
the key question which this dissertation is motivated by. I argue that the outcomes of social
movements in the MENA are not like the consequences of social movements in other countries.
Finally, I discuss some of the limitation of this project and potential extension of the project in
future studies.
To examine these questions this research endeavors to argue the new wave of social
movements is not explainable through the old theories of social movements. Additionally, not all
the theories of social movements either old or new are applicable to the region of MENA.
By comparing political outcomes of three case studies, this research will answer these
questions and present a model for describing the political outcomes of social movements in
MENA. Besides this research aims to argue that the outcomes of social movements in the MENA
are not like the consequences of social movements in other countries. Further, we explore
answers to the questions by applying a case study approach. In order to analyze the involved
factors that impact the outcome of social movements, it will be a comparison among some

8
contemporary cases that happened in the MENA (The Arab Spring both successful and
unsuccessful cases), to comprehend various social movements inside the Middle East with the
help of the old and new theories of social movements12.

12

Bosi, Lorenzo, and Katrin Uba. “Introduction: the outcome of social movement.” Mobilization 14 (2009): 409415.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS
Before elaborating on the main arguments of this dissertation and discussing it, it is
necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the main definition of contentious politics
and realize what contentious politics is about. However, first I must point out the distinction
between contentious politics and social movement. Although sometimes these two terms are
used interchangeably, they are quite different concepts. Yet first I must define “contentious
politics”. Tilly and Tarrow (2015)13, define contentious politics as what actors do by using public
performances to make claims on authorities. Involved actors in contentious politics by taking
advantage of public opportunities would use some forms of collective actions (repertoires) to
make the claims on the authorities. The claim could be on any demand which is against other
actor’s interests or somehow lead to mutual interests or programs which are related to the
governments either as the initiators of claims or third parties. Tilly and Tarrow (2015)14 argue
that what makes contentious politics different from social movements is that contentious politics
is the point where three features of contention, collective action and politics converge.
Social movements have several basic properties of movements. The contention is about
making claims which are somehow standing on other actor’s interests. Thus, it could be said that
more than one party is involved in contention so that one party works as a subject who is making
a claim and the other one as an object who is the receiver of a claim. Yet, the range of claims

13

Tarrow, Sidney, and Charles Tilly. Policy (s) of the conflict. From the strike to the revolution. Paris: The Paris
Institute of Political Studies Press, 2015.
14

Ibid
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could vary from a very decent one to more vociferous demands or even attacks which could be
threatening to the object’s interests. So, the main components of the contention are subjects,
objects, and claims. (Johnston, 1995)15

Figure 1. Contentious Politics: The Interaction Among Contention, Collective Action, and
Politics

Collective
Action

Contention

Politics

Collective action refers to any non-institutionalized harmonious endeavors in the
direction of shared interests. Collective actions could occur both outside and inside the political
environment or even without any contention 16.

15

Johnston, Hank, and Bert Klandermans. "The cultural analysis of social movements." Social movements and
culture 4 (1995): 3-24.
16

McAdam, Doug, and Yang Su. "The war at home: Antiwar protests and congressional voting, 1965 to
1973." American sociological review (2002): 696-721.

11
Until the time that there is no direct interaction with the government or no engagement in
activities related to government interests or regulations, the collective action has nothing to do
with the political environment. According to Tilly and Tarrow, politics which is the third
component of the contentious politics also ranges from simple usual matters to significant topics.
However, most likely politics bring little or no contention to the overall situation.
There are four primary types of collective actions: the crowd, the masses, the public, and the
social movements. According to Lofland (1993) 17 the crowd refers to a massive number of
people in nearness. The masses and the public are quite similar. However, the masses refer to a
large group of people with a common interest while the public is an unorganized massive group
of people with common ideas.
Although sometimes the term social movement is being used interchangeably with
notions of contentious politics, Tarrow and Tilly by providing plenty of evidence argue that
expansion of the term social movement for defining all the social movement bases (social
background, collective action, organizational resources, etc.) has some downsides. The first
drawback is that putting all types of contention under the same category would make an accurate
comparison hard. Secondly, by counting all forms of contention as social movements testing
transitions among them would be problematic. Lastly, categorizing all contention under the
social movement label would make the fact that social movements are not a universal but a
vague historical category.
Now the question we must ask is what meets the requirements of a social movement?
Each group of scholars has defined “social movement” differently. Some groups defined social
movements as an action in which actors of central conflicts in society would lead the direction of
17

Lofland, John. Polite protesters: The American peace movement of the 1980s. Syracuse University Press, 1993.
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the conflict in the exact opposite direction of the historical process by expressing their critical
oppositions 18.
While others define social movements as an act which by expressing a specific type of
collective action, aims to move beyond the limits of a given system.
Tarrow and Tilly define a social movement as a continuous campaign in which actors by using
repeated repertoires make certain claims. According to Sidney Tarrow, what is important about
social movements is that they have proceeded as interactive campaigns like electoral or religious
and not as solo performances. Accordingly, social movements defined as the relations between
groups of claimants and the object of their claims with third parties like authorities, adversaries,
and allies while the role of various citizens in clarifying the campaigns is usually significant.
(Tilly and Tarrow, 2007.)19Yet, Tilly and Tarrow make the point that not all forms of contentious
politics are social movements.
Solo performances of public or claimants would not count as a social movement but
interactive campaigns. Social movements are a combination of continuous campaigns of claimmaking; a collection of public performances such as rallies, demonstrations; constant public
displays such as wearing specific colors or displaying signs, chanting slogans which all these
social movement bases are built on links and network, organizations and unions. Henceforth,
what counts as a social movement is the synthesis of these three elements (Tilly, 2004)20. This
combination might not be a new concept in Western countries since the emergence of the social

18

Touraine, Alain. "The voice and the eye: An analysis of social movements." (1981).

19
Tarrow, Sidney, and Charles Tilly. "Contentious politics and social movements." In the Oxford handbook of
comparative politics. 2007.
20

Tilly, Charles. Contention and democracy in Europe, 1650-2000. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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movements in the late eighteenth century, but it was uncommon or even absent in much of the
contemporary world especially MENA which is the case of this study.
The important point which should be mentioned is the necessity of another concept other
than a combination of the above three elements for emerging of a social movement. That concept
is democratization. Democratization is a factor that could enhance the formation of social
movements. Tilly (2004) defines democratization as an enhancement of regimes in providing
comprehensive and equal citizenship with protection and creating channels and resources for
offering consultations to citizen’s demands. Democratic institutions, he continues, could
decrease the array of well-known and popular collective actions and limit violent uprisings.
Change and variation in some elements could cause different outcomes and consequences for
social movements in time and space. The social movements, in time and space, could disappear
or morph into another form of politics 21.
The main element which could cause different outcomes is political environments; The
character of a social movement in democracy will not be like a social movement in nondemocracy. The second element is the interactions that occur within the course of a social
movement; for instance, the outcome of a social movement could change dramatically based on
an interaction of police guards with demonstrators from a peaceful protest to a violent revolt.
Lastly, the communication between the participants in social movements, the citizens, authorities

21

Goldstone, Jack Andrew. "Cross-class Coalitions and the Making of the Arab Revolts of 2011." Swiss Political
Science Review 17, no. 4 (2011): 457.
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or any object of claims during the source of social movement could sometimes lead to achieving
a great outcome or in contrast could totally mislead the social movement 2223.
Social movements can occur in three stages of local, national, and global. Moreover,
according to Aberle (1966)24, there are some related classifications and patterns of social
movements that are based on their demand and the amount of change they want which could help
us to understand them better: reform movements, revolutionary movements, redemptive
movements, alternative movements, and resistance movements.
Reform movements advocate for minor changes in the social structure (Anti-nuclear
movement). In contrast, resistance movements try to prevent or undo any change to social
structure (The Ku Klux Klan). On the other hand, revolutionary movements seek fundamental
and radical changes in every feature of the society (movements of 1979 in Iran against the Shah,
Chinese communist movements, Bolsheviks in Russia). Redemptive movements usually have a
religious nature and seek to arouse ideality, inner change, and spirituality in individuals (New
age). Lastly, alternative movements aim is self-improvement and creating changes in an
individual’s beliefs and principles 25.
Now that we studied the definition of the social movement, its preconditions, and various
types, in the rest of the chapter, we will review various theories of social movements.

22
Chabot, Sean, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. "Globalization and transnational diffusion between social movements:
reconceptualizing the dissemination of the Gandhian repertoire and the" coming out’ routine." Theory and
Society 31, no. 6 (2002): 697-740
23

Scalmer, Sean. "The labor of diffusion: the peace pledge union and the adaptation of the Gandhian
repertoire." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 7, no. 3 (2002): 269-286.
24

Aberle, David F. "A Classification of Social Movements." The Peyote Religion among the Navaho (1966): 31533.
25

Johnston, Hank. What is a social movement? John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
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Thus, first we are going to review the mainstream theories of the social movements, analyze
them and examine the changes in theories of social movements through the time. Later, by
analyzing the roots and origins of these theories the aim of this chapter is to establish the
theoretical context for this dissertation. To have a broad understanding of the roots and origins of
theories of social movements, it is necessary to dig in the scholarly debates and perspectives
from the late 1970s to the present and review the real causes and preconditions for the
occurrence of the social movements. Lastly, in this chapter we are going to examine whether
achieving the demanded outcome in different social and political contexts would be the same.
Also we are going to examine whether the theories of social movements would be able to explain
MENA region since the existing theories are particularly based on social movements in Northern
democracies and their capability for explaining the emergence of social movements and the
essential requirements in non-democracies is unclear.
To begin, first we are going to clarify one of the main scholarly debates which questions
whether social movements can create structural and political changes or if social movements are
the outcomes of political change and not the cause of it 26.
While the answer to this question would be different in different contexts such as
democracies or non-democracies, my research supports the scholars who believe social
movements are not the outcome but the main drivers of social and political change and playing
key roles in transforming autocracy to democracy.27

26

Earl, Jennifer. "Methods, movements, and outcomes." Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 22
(2000): 3-25.
27
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. "Dynamics of contention." Social Movement Studies 2, no. 1
(2003): 99-102.
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In this regard, having a comprehensive understanding of the theories of social movements
and collective action is beneficial and necessary. With a broad understanding about these
theories we would be able to describe and explain social movements and also examine the way
such movements form and mobilize, what outcome they try to achieve, what they are mobilizing
against, assess policies and strategies regarding the particular outcomes and, also to what extent
this mobilization or counter-mobilization could succeed or fail. 28
All these theories have a background and history and none of them arise or operate in a
vacuum. Accordingly, in response to the realities of subject-matter, they have gone through
many changes and renovations. However, the point of this dissertation’s explaining the
background of these theories to highlight the intellectual tools that they provide are not
compatible with the task of explaining social movements in MENA.
Theories of social movements have experienced substantial changes since the 1940s,
especially in the last couple of years. These changes had a significant impact on socio-historical
contexts and on the experiences, which caused the theorists to revise the definition of their
subject-matter.
To explain the different types of social movements in different social conditions along
with the history behind their formation and their achieved political outcomes, we must study the
main leading social movement theories from a historical perspective.

2.1 The Classical Theories of Social Movements
The content of most of the collective action in the 1950s and 1960s contrasted with
conventional definitions for political participation. It promoted concepts like peace, freedom and
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civil rights which all were advocating moving from self-centered ideas towards emancipation.
The American theorists took their inspirations from the dominant social movements that
happened in the 60s like the American Civil Rights movements, the Anti-War Movement, and
the National Student Liberation. While these movements each had specific demands like calling
an end to racial segregation in the American civil rights, removal of the US military and troops
national student liberation, they all had one thing in common; all were self-consciously oriented
and all were perceived as forces for paving the way towards democracy. (Skopol,1979)29
The contemporary treatment of collective behavior theory and identity builds upon the classical
theories and social-psychological grounds.
The key sources for sociological studying of social movements beginning in the 1970s
were four mainstream theories: Collective behavior theory, resource mobilization theory,
framing, and political process theory. Since many leading social theorists had a Marxist
background or were members of student movements of the 60s and 70s, the Marxist theory was
one of the impactful theories on the study of collective phenomena 30313233. Thus, before
examining these four schools of thought we must briefly review theories of Marx, Lenin,
Gramsci, and Tilly since they were the initiators of social movement theories and their emphasis
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on the element of collective action was determinative. Marx and Engels were the initiators of
theories of social movements. According to them, individuals will involve in collective actions
when their social class is in paradox with its adversaries.
In the Marxist theory, the foundation of collective action is self-awareness of a class of
society from their task regarding making a change and reformation. Put differently, they believe
that social structure is the foundation of collective action. Thus, as other scholars argue, Marx
and Engels instead of studying mechanisms that attract individuals into collective actions just
refer to the collective engagement of individuals to society’s structural development.
They did not consider the role of resources and politics which is needed to engage in collective
actions. the problem which has concerned theorists since then was although according to Marx
engagement of the individuals in collective actions based on their self-awareness 34.
But what is the reason that some actors despite the presence of objective conditions for revolt
sometimes fail to do so? He replied to his critiques with the theory of “false consciousness”
which argues that the failure of actors to act at the proper time is due to unawareness caused by
their class enemies. Although this argument was not acceptable since scholars believe that
examining false or realness of consciousness is not possible 35.
According to social movement theorists, Marx’s theory was flawed because it did not
consider the role of leadership or even the culture of the working-class. In general, he ignored
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addressing the role of political conditions which are compulsory for creating proper opportunities
for revolutionary mobilization36.
The main critique of Marxist theory was Lenin whose major concern was the problem of
leadership. His main argument and criticism of Marx’s theory was regarding the objective
conditions. By referring to the Western European experiences he argues that instead of waiting
for objective conditions, it is possible to create an organization with a revolutionary leadership to
solve the problem of the working class37.
Later, Lenin’s theory took hold in Russia and the occurrence of the Communist
movement at that time weakened Western social democracy. The failure of the Russian
Revolution moving towards the West in 1917, was the main argument of Gramsci, a European
Marxist that raising a revolution in the West is not possible with vanguard forms of
organizations. By criticizing Lenin’s theory, he emphasizes on working-class culture. Thus, by
revising Lenin’s theory he suggests training a team of organic intellectuals to complement
traditional ones in the party leadership. He believes in this way by producing a countercultural
harmony among workers it is possible to give workers the ability to interact with other social
establishments. Yet, he was aware that this task requires the party to learn how to deal with the
ups and downs of the middle-class society. This was what caused a new dilemma38.The problem
was Gramsci’s theory not only did not have a guideline regarding the ways to fight the battle
between the working and middle-class but was just based on the influence of the working-class
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on bourgeois society and ignored the common sense of middle-class society. Moreover, his
theory was flawed since it was without a theory of political mobilization it was not able to
distinguish between polities with strong or weak opportunities and limitations 39.
Among the next generation, there was Charles Tilly, influenced by Marxism, who is well
known for his ideas related to structural variables in shaping contention, state structure and state
strategic imperatives (Tilly, 1986;1990). Later, Tilly introduces his “Polity Model” which studies
the interactions among rulers, polity members and outside actors (1977)40. Since all the above
theories had some shortcomings, beginning the 1970s, contemporary social scientists started to
propose solutions to these flaws. With all being said, now we are going to briefly review the four
main schools of thought which emerged in social science to examine their contribution to the
concept of social movement and contentious politics as of today.

2.2 Collective Behavior Theory
Collective behavior theory as its early version began to form by arguments of theorists
such as Le Bon (1985), lofland (1993) and Blumer (1969) is noninstitutionalized activity in
which several people voluntarily engage According to this group of scholars, there are four
primary forms of collective behavior, the crowd, the mass, the public and social movements. In
all these forms of collective behavior people would be engaged voluntarily for a common
interest. The crowds are usually formed by many people. There are four different types of crowd:
casual crowds, conventional crowds, expressive crowds, and acting crowds. Casual crowds are a
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group of people that are present in the same place at a same time but do not have any interaction
with each other. Conventional crowds same as the previous group are in the same place at the
same time but for a planned or scheduled event. The goal of the third type of crowd is expressing
emotions. And the focus of the last type of crowd is on a goal or an action.
A mass refers to many people with common interest but incapable of acting together in
an organized collaborative way. A public is so like the mass regarding the large number of
people who are unrelated and unorganized, but the main difference is while the members of a
mass have common interests, the members of a public share ideas. The last category which is
social movements was explained in detail before 41. They viewed members of the crowd as
irrational, uncontrolled groups of people who join uprisings or riots since outside the crowd they
would not be able to as an anonymous member.
There are three main theories on collective behavior. The first, the emergent-norm
perspective, emphasizes the importance of social norms in crowd behavior. The next, the valueadded theory, is a functionalist perspective that states that several preconditions must be in place
for collective behavior to occur. Finally, the assembling perspective focuses on collective action
rather than collective behavior, addressing the processes associated with crowd behavior and the
lifecycle and various categories of gatherings.
Accordingly, the classical social movement theorists such as Smelser (1962) builds on
earlier collective behavior theorists, that social movements emerge as a result of any severe
social strain due to interruption in the normal functioning of society (social change), like
industrial development, technologies, and urbanization. Thus, according to Smelser for the
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occurrence of an episode of collective behavior which is the necessity of social movement, at
least some sort of strain must be present 42.
However, the mentioned features were related to the earlier version of the collective
behavior theory. Later, political scientists revised this theory to create a politically connected
view of social movements. In contrast to classic collective behavior theorists, political scientists
argue that movements do not occur as a matter of disruption in the normal functioning of society.
Social movements are logical happenings and related crowds that have rational behaviors. They
treat interest groups as a normal part of the political process since they believe that societies are
rarely stable. Moreover, while system strain always presents to some degree, relying on it as the
main cause of social movements is problematic. It is possible to argue that strain is a required,
but an inadequate prerequisite of social movements 43.

2.3 Political Process Theory (PPT)
Another social movement theory developed by American scholars encouraged by the
upsurge of contentious politics in the Civil Rights movement is known as political process
theory. Tilly (1978) was the one who started initiating ideas related to preconditions for
mobilization such as opportunity/threat to protesters and facilitation/repression by the system.
While some American social scientists started focusing on urban politics and linking protests to
different measures of local opportunity or even using protest as a political resource, Doug
McAdam (1999)44 by elaborating on Tilly’s model and synthesizing all these various approaches,
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developed “political process model. In contrast to the Tilly’s model, political process theorists
instead of focusing on all features of opportunity/threat and facilitation/repression just tried to
emphasis on opportunities to examine different concerns like how movements exploit
opportunities or how various political structures would be able to create different degrees of
opportunity to uprising groups and lastly study the process of change of opportunities related to a
specific movement over time.
According to McAdam, political opportunity can explain the emergence of social
movements with the help of various elements. The first one is related to having enough access to
the political system which varies based on the degree of the system’s openness. The second one
is the stability or instability of coalitions and political ranks. The next element is the presence of
potential allies and their position. Another factor is related to the conflicts among or inside the
elites who facilitate or limit collective action and their tolerance for handling the grievances. The
other factor is the ability of the political system to block oppositional movements. The last factor
that has been added recently is basically regarding the international/geopolitical forces that can
generate the desirable opportunities for the occurrence of a movement.
All the mentioned factors are impactful on protestant behaviors and their formation, the
occurrence of the movements and besides the interaction of movements with the political system.
PPT theorists emphasize an advancement of a universal theory of social movements which has
been predicated upon some structural constant factors that movements actors have no control
over them. Put differently, according to PPT what could initiate the mobilization of a mass
movement mostly is the presence of the popular political pressure from the state part and the
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confluence of the public’s awareness of that presence along with the ability and willingness to
exploit it45.
The problem which almost was present in all various political process theorist’s works
until the 1990s was applicability of the political process models to just democratize the West and
nowhere else.
The second problem of the political process until the 1990s was related to undermining the role
of repression and threat. And lastly, although the name of the model was political process theory,
it did not examine the process of contention and scholars failed to study the correlation of
different elements in the model to one another and its related mechanisms.
Moreover, this theory contrasts with RMT because instead of focusing on human and material
resources which are available to social movement organizations it focuses on the political
environment which SMO’s are active in 46.
Since PPT could shape the research agenda of the field, among scholars of social
movement it is known as the “hegemonic paradigm”. This model assumes political opportunities
have the potential to create the required opportunity for collective actions.

2.4 Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT)
Development of the Resource mobilization theory began by criticizing classical theories
that argue social movements are arising under social disorganization and injustice conditions.
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The initiators of this theory, McCarthy and Zald (1973)47, argue that the cumulative level of
strain or dissatisfaction which according to the collective behavior theorists are the causal
significance of the social movements are insufficient causes. In contrast, according to the
resource mobilization theory, insurgency arises from the increase in the level of essential
resources to support collective protest activity, not rise in discontent.
Thus, the key factor in the success of this theory is about the available resources and how
to exploit them; e.g. using the existing organization for forming coalitions, forming effective and
structured campaigns in response to political pressures, demanding financial support, career
benefits and security.
Based on their arguments, generally, resource mobilization theorists disregard ideology
or any irrational factor in the study of social movements. In fact, scholars such as McCarthy,
Zald, Tilly, and Oberschall believe that social movements are rational, organized, and targeted
phenomena that arise by calculating the cost and benefit.
This theory which is known as one of the dominant theories for studying social
movements in the United States aims to explain how actors could use the most out of the created
opportunities in the political system, either preventive or facilitative. Based on RMT, the role
which resources play for oppositional groups before mobilization and how these groups engage
these resources is so critical to define how capable they are in making their presence felt and if
they can to create any level of change (Jenkins, 1983)48.
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What needs to be mentioned here is that according to the main social movement’s
theorists, Charles Tilly, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, preparation for mobilization to fight
with injustice, which is always in the society, needs both resources and rational orientation to
action 49. Put differently, the actions of actors in social movements should not be interpreted as if
they are controlled by feelings, emotions, or thoughts, but should be read in terms of
opportunities for actions or the logic of costs and benefits. In this theory, what appears as a
crucial feature of social mobilization is leadership. Zald and McCarthy emphasis on the key role
which this factor could play in recognizing and outlining the complaints and using the
opportunities for beginning collective action. As such, structured leadership is the precondition
of structured group action.
Additionally, the focus of RMT is on the economic factor or aspects related to money and
labor to raise collective actions. In this schema, the occurrence, strength, and impact of a social
movement organization (SMO) is significantly correlated with the capacity to collectivize the
efficient communications and effective people. As such, RMT is based on this principle that a
high level of technical expertise is the requisite of the social change50.

2.5 Framing Theory
The occurrence of movements with no time for mobilizing resources or the failure of
some well-founded groups for attaining actual collective actions, calls into question the
significance of resource mobilization theory for explaining the establishment of social
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movements51. The concept of the frame was initiated by Goffman (1974)52 and later found its
way to the study of social movements. According to Goffman frames are outlined that let
individuals make occurrences in the world meaningful based on the set of beliefs. in other words,
frames consist of action-oriented sets of beliefs that could validate happenings and operations
related to a social movement organization 53. Accordingly, the collective action frames would
endlessly evolve during the movement meetings and campaigns.
The main purposes of the evolution of frames are to absorb more members, mobilizing the
participants, obtaining more resources.
The focus of this theory is interpreting the role of shared expectations and norms held by
actors in events and curing the problems. Thus, frame processes attempt to analyze collective
actions represented by actors in terms of motivations, beliefs, and discourses. Moreover, it
focuses on the process of production and utilization of frames during different phases of a
movement along with the impact of ideas, culture, and attitudes on the repertoires of action and
contention 54.
Additionally, frame theory mentions the critical roles of ideology, its contradictions, and
the consequences it could bring for followers, counter-movements, and the system. Factors such
as language, leadership, media, and institutions all have a significant impact on the framing
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process. According to Benford and Snow (2005)55, successful social movements adhere to three
categories of frames for achieving their goals: Diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and
motivational framing.
Diagnostic framing offers a clear solution for a specific demand. The claim of this type of
framing is “we believe something is wrong and we know how to fix it”. Prognostic framing
states the solution for the social movement problem along with the application. Lastly,
motivational framing calls for action. This frame is what happens once individuals agree with
either diagnostic or prognostic framing.

2.6 New Social Movement Theory
This theory arises in the 1970s, from the classic European social theory and political
philosophy with critics on the dominant Marxist theory which looks at social movements as
mirroring a major conflict among classes regarding economic production. In other words, the
main aim of this theory was explaining the increase of postindustrial, or movements related to
the quality of life, which are not explainable by using the classic theories of social movements 56.
In general, new social movements tempt to discuss different features of everyday life or
what traditionally is being called outside politics by getting through the traditional class,
socioeconomic associations, and political parties. The nature of these movements is more
relaxed, diverse, and informal with preference of non-hierarchical methods and irregular political
engagement in comparison to the older social movements.
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Since the emergence of the new social movement theories was along with different
themes in Europe like the student movement that chose them in 1968, such as feminist and
ecological movements and anti-nuclear movements, the new social movement theories selected a
direction against the classical Marxism in order to cover both non-class and new social and
political logic 57.
The key objective of this theory which was initiated by European theorists like Alberto
Melucci (1994)58 and Allen Touraine was proving the insufficiency of classical Marxism by
arguing that the foundation of all the politically significant social action was rooted in capitalism
and all other social logics were inferior at best in shaping social action. Accordingly, the main
claim of this theory was creating a structural development in Western societies and improving
the previous class conflicts.
In fact, the reason behind the emergence of new social movements theory was the
appearance of some types of movements which at their core were not related to grievances of a
group of people seeking to influence political outcomes. New social movements (NSMs) were
being based on the features of postindustrial societies and concepts related to the quality of life
and self-realization 59.
Touraine was inspired by the 1968 France movements and explained his social movement
theory by the idea of social action. According to him, human societies not only can reproduce
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themselves but also would be able to produce their goals and values. Besides, human societies
have the ability of self-reflection and self-production.
Melucci, on the other hand, was inspired by Jurgen Habermas’s60 thoughts. According to
him, in modern societies, due to the expansion of the government and market, the individualistic
activities of people have decreased. Thus, the new social movements attempt to stand against the
comprehensive intervention of the system and revive the individuality and the right to have a
specific quality of life. The new movement aims to increase the scope of individual authority
outside the government control and preserve personal independence against the political and
bureaucratic intervention of the government. The new social movements mostly try to challenge
the current policies in society. Their goal is the creation of a safe environment for individuals
with no authority to practice their philosophies freely 61.
Regarding the comparison between the traditional and new social movement theories
there is one characteristic of new social movement theories that distinguish those from other
social movement theories. New social movement are hypothesized and shaped in a specific
historical phase of progress of Western liberal societies. Precisely, while each theory focus and
explain differentiated models clearly like modernization and post modernization, post-materialist
society, post-industrial society or advanced capitalist society, they all have one shared aim which
is operating based upon a kind of “societal totality”. This societal totality is chained to any new
evolving structural factors in Western Europe that were generating new forms of sociopolitical
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action while the old order was disbanding in the process of creating a context for collective
action 62.
In extension, I am going to elaborate more on the comparison between the features of
new social movements with the classic movements and briefly describe the results.

Table 1. Comparison Between Classic and New Social Movements
Classical Social Movements

New Social Movements

Goal

Working along with the status
quo

Challenging the status quo

Struggle

Class-conflict regarding the
distribution and production

Conflict regarding the norm
and values

Motivation

Using movements as a tool for
reaching benefit and
advantages

Motivation is expressing
being/ informal in
participation and membership

Structure

Static, focused, and
hierarchical

flexible, diverse, open, and
participatory

Strategy

Cooperating with the
government for reaching the
goals

Impacting public mind/people
and following the strategies
outside politics

•

Goal: the classical social movements were working along with the status quo; while new
social movements challenging the status quo. Put differently, their concern is the status
quo and not just the system.

•

Struggle: the struggle in classical movements was about production and distribution but
in new social movements, values and principles are the main concerns.
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•

Motivation: in classical movements, the movement was a tool for reaching benefits and
advantages but in new movements, motivation is expressing being and identity and
participation is voluntary with no expectation.

•

Structure: the classical movements were structured, static and hierarchical while new
movements are flexible, diverse, and open.

•

Strategy: strategies of classical movements were either for cooperating with the
government or dominating it to reach their goals. New social movements by following
outside politics try to influence public minds and they are not after political power.
(Bradley, 2005)63
To conclude, what is clear is that all these theories, either classic or new have been

developed almost exclusively regarding the social movements occurred in western democracies
particularly Europe and United States. As a result, our understanding about the formation,
development, and the political outcomes of social movements in other parts of the world remains
underdeveloped. What is clear is that the formation of the social movements and the changes
they could cause all differ based on the political (democracy or non-democracy), economic, and
social context they might occur. Effective strategies in one context might not work in another
context. Most of the mechanisms of the mentioned theories are not relevant to the closed political
context of the Middle East.64
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CHAPTER 3
APPLYING DIFFERENT SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES TO THE CASE OF
MENA
The occurrence of social movements is ultimately dependent on the presence of a
conducive political environment. A conducive political environment according to McAdam
(1994)65 can provide opportunities for successful uprisings. Yet, some resources should be
existing, so that the actors would be able to obtain the mentioned opportunities. Thus, it is
possible to argue that the presence of the essential resources, the aggrieved population with
conversion potential, would be able to change the political opportunities to a social protest.
A conducive political environment consists of five crucial resources that I am going to briefly
explain. Participants, social movement organizations, solidarity incentives, networks, leaders.
According to the scholars, members can be recruited by some indigenous organizations
which are well known as the primary source of movement participants or they can be all
members of a specific coalition with the same demands and dissatisfactions. In both cases as
Oberschall (1978)66 argues the process of mobilization does not happen by recruiting isolated
and solitary members but in contrast individuals who are already prepared and contributors.
The second resources are social movement organization (SMOs). The tasks of SMOs
vary based on the size and culture of the society, but any type of society SMOs must compete
with other sectors and associations for resources (money, facilities, and labor). But basically,
their tasks are managing mobilizing supporters, handling the financial resources, encouraging
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mass and the elite public to join the movement, and realizing the change in targets 67. SMOs have
nothing to do with the formation of social movements.
The other resources are established structures of solidarity incentives which are available
to indigenous organizations. This term refers to rewards or the motive force which encourages
participation in these groups and at the same time stop the problem of free riding. In fact, based
on these incentives, members should participate in the process to get the reward. However, it
should be mentioned that rewards could be affected based on the structure of society and
authorities 68.
The next source is the way in which the aggrieved members of these organizations
communicate with each other. It is through the established networks and infrastructures which
the quality of movements truly depends on them. Social movement theorists believe that failure
or success of contemporary social movements highly depend on the presence or absence of a
solid network of communication.
Lastly, almost all the social movement theorists have declared the importance of a
recognized leadership for directing a social movement. In fact, it is possible that the aggrieved
population cannot handle the correct collective action at the right time even with the presence of
favorable political opportunities.
Thus, the existence of these sources is crucial for the preparation of a conducive political
environment in which the occurrence of social movements would be so likely in it.
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Now, after reviewing the required resources and desirable preconditions for the emergence of
social movements I am going to apply some of the mainstream theories of social movements to
the case of MENA to examine if they are applicable to this case and if not, what makes it
impossible.

3.1 Applying the Resource Mobilization Theory on the MENA
Based on all the mentioned theories in chapter one, both American and European social
movement theorists define social movements as episodes of collective actions which mostly
present and structured constant, self-conscious challenge to the present authorities 69.
These theories emerged in constitutionally open and technically advanced western societies.
Accordingly, the main attempts of these theories were operating business-like enterprises whose
success is dependent on technical proficiency factors. Moreover, the acts of mobilization and
objection are more related to engaging and influencing the key political institutions like houses
of representatives, congresses, and political parties by the actors of the movement to create the
desired changes 70.
Resource mobilization theory which is known as one of the leading models for studying
collective actions in Western societies tries to explain how in presence of political opportunities
(both facilitative or inhibitive ones) actors would be able to recognize and grasp the opportunities
in order to initiate proper actions. Thus, according to Buechler, in this scenario, what is crucial
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in distinguishing the outcome and the level of change the oppositional group can create, is the
resources available to them before mobilizing along with the ways they employed the resources.
Accordingly, another factor that plays a significant role in social mobilization is
structured leadership. This factor could help actors both to recognize grievances and related
opportunities for starting collective action 71. In fact, RMT theorists believe that the requirement
for a fruitful one is an executive leadership.
Now the question is whether this would be the case in a context where political settings
like proper institutions and specialized staffs are non-existent or if they are present, they are
either non-qualified or hardly limited by the authoritarian systems. Additionally, since the
political channels for causing an impactful change or creating social and political reforms are
under the control of parties with domination over specific exercises of power, mobilization acts
like petitioning or lobbying for persuading the government of creating change is futile 72.
MENA region is the only region that is home to several states with all the above characteristics,
where mobilization is severely handicapped. Thus, MENA would be a great case for examining
these questions, since any of the countries in this region such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
and Iran have a unique history of authoritarianism. Moreover, according to the evidence, all the
mentioned countries were stubborn in establishing conditions for the requirement of professional
staff and launching formal organizations. For instance, Iran experienced the improvement of civil
society under the administration of Mohammad Khatami (1977-2005), who was a reformist.
During this era, opposition groups such as women and student movements were able to operate
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with some degree of freedom. However, this was a unique case and lasted until the rise of
Ahmadinejad to power. Nothing like this case has ever happened in any other more authoritarian
settings that opponent groups have even a low degree of authority or opportunity to involve in
any type of dissident actions.
Relatedly, in all the closed authoritarian environments, government by infusing different
strategies into oppositional movements tries to restrict any act of mobilization attempted to
convince the system to adopt social and political alterations. In the case of MENA, most of the
challenges to the present authorities are some form of open and short-lived contentions without
any ideology, structure or official leadership as opposed to the organized and sustained social
movements of the WEST 73.
Another possibility which also happens in MENA states is barricading any social or
political change which is going to happen by parties with a monopoly overpower. Thus, in
circumstances, where oppositional groups simply do not have any access to open political
channels or any political rights and they usually face constraints, they might search for
alternative channels which mostly is a public space to use it as a ground for their resistance,
disobedience and express their dissatisfaction or raise their voice to reach their desired demands.
According to evidence, urban streets are well-known particularly as a place for challenging the
status quo by citizens of the MENA region 74. Some scholars define this phenomenon which had
been seen many times in the Middle East and North Africa as a constant and influential aspect of
contention, to express dissatisfaction in the region. Examples of this phenomenon are the Iranian
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revolution in 1979, the uprising of dignity in Bahrain in 1994, the Iranian student movement in
1999, massive demonstrations in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and many other countries in the region,
in the current century 75.
Similarly, according to the scholars, streets of MENA have the potential to change to a
place for expressing objections, faking identities, and expanding solidarities. Moreover, there is
always the possibility of transforming a small protest to a massive demonstration with the
purpose of challenging the status quo. Thus, it is fair to argue that public places in the MENA
have gained a new identity in the past decades which is first the common spot of conflicts
between the system and the masses and second, the mediator of initiating and developing social
and political conflicts. Additionally, urban spaces have another ability which is playing a
strategic role in strengthening the cause of social and political reform. This ability would help
them to play an alternative role in acts of contestation and negation like lobbying and awarenessraising and as substitute channels for demanding change and reforms where the proper political
channels like senates, parliaments, and institutions are ineffective. To elaborate more on this
subject, I am going to review some of the recognized episodes of contention that have occurred
across the MENA in the past decades and that have failed.
One of the well-known cases is related to Bahrain uprisings which were during 19941999. During these uprisings, about 1500 Bahraini activists, leftists, liberals along with Islamists
joined forces, held a sit demonstration in front of the Ministry of Labor to demand democratic
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reforms. However, at the end of the uprisings, their efforts were unsuccessful. Another case is
related to the student movement of Iran in 1999 which occurred as the outcome of the attack by
groups associated with the conservative parties to the Tehran University dormitory. During this
movement, about 60,000 demonstrators which were mostly students and youths occupied public
spaces of Tehran and other big cities to show their dissatisfaction with the system. Although,
again their efforts in creating political and social reforms were fruitless since their petition got
sabotaged by the people in charge inside the governmental and judicial branches, who were
responsible to send the reformation bills for the vote to the parliament.

3.2 Applying PPT Theory on MENA Cases
Political process theory, in contrast to RMT instead of focusing on human and material
resources available to social movement organizations, focuses on political environments. As
mentioned before, the main emphasis of the political process theory is on structural conditions.
As such, according to this theory what would pave the way for the formation of the collective
action is the favorable political opportunities 76.
Thus, the political process theorists argue that mass mobilization could be a reaction to
opportunities that expose the weakness of the state to political pressures. Moreover, they believe
that these types of opportunities that can generate mass mobilizations either exist or do not. Put
differently, this theory assumes that political opportunities are preexisting conditions, and actors
should only wait for the proper time to pursue them.
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However, this is the part that makes application of this theory, which is mainly about
pursuing opportunities to mobilize, to countries with a closed authoritarian system like Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, or Syria, debatable. In these cases, and similar states in the MENA region,
political opportunities are rarely present and if they are, government-specified them to prevent
any questionable actions against the status quo. As such, members of oppositions or oppositional
leaders who risk their lives by exceeding the narrow limits could experience consequences like
detention, long term jails, and show trials or execution 77. As an example, it is possible to
highlight the case of the execution of Sheikh Nimr in Saudi Arabia who was the supporter of the
mass anti-government demonstrations that occurred in Eastern Province in 2011, where the Shia
majority has a long history of marginalization.
As a result, it is hard to argue that PPT theory applies to environments like the MENA
region where oppositional movements rarely have access to an open opportunity to mobilize.
However, as we witnessed the contemporary movements in MENA, lack of political opportunity
in MENA led to the formation of movements with specific features. These features are in sharp
contrast with organized and constant oppositional movements in the West. Yet, they are
momentary battles, without well-defined leadership, clear ideology, or organized organization 78.
Hence, these features induce us to examine factors other than open opportunities and
root causes of collective action which could lead to mobilization in the MENA. It is fair to argue
that open opportunities as mentioned in PPT theory are not present in the MENA region.
However, there are some examples of mobilization in this context such as the Iranian Green
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Movement in 2009, where although the political space was so closed and no opportunity was
provided by the state, groups of women, youths and students who were motivated by the unjust
policies of the new administration and dissatisfaction with the election outcome, created the
opportunities. Another example in Tunisia is what happened two years later than the Green
Movement which triggered the happening of the “Arab Spring”. A young street vendor set
himself afire in response to the confiscation of his merchandise by a municipal officer. This
occurrence caused a massive demonstration in Tunisia and initiated the Arab Spring
phenomenon 79.
While many scholars argue that in these types of situations, demonstrators somehow felt
obliged to risk their lives regarding the government’s behavior, others believe that in closed
political spaces where the status quo is unfair, incidents of self-immolations could trigger the
future mobilization and leave a mark on history.
Based on the above discussion it is possible to argue that the mainstream theories of
social movements that two of them have been applied to the case of MENA without exception,
fall short of comprehensively clarifying the concept of mass mobilization. Accordingly, as their
characteristics, we can point out to certain assumptions and West-centric tendencies which make
them incapable to reckon the uniqueness of MENA cases.

3.3 Applying New Social Movement Theory on MENA Cases
Since the foundation of the new social movement theory is based on the Western
technologically advanced and politically open societies, obviously the experience of the Iranian
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and Tunisian demonstrators who were in the streets demanding change has no reflection on it. As
such, the applicability of the new social movement theory with solid assumptions about the
social movement is highly problematic to the cases of the Middle East and North Africa.
Since a specific phase in the development of Western liberal societies led to the
generation of the new social movement theories, different models of the theory mostly involve
advanced capitalist, post-industrial or post materialist societies 80.
New social movements theory formed and could be practiced in Western societies with a
stable democracy. Even according to the concept of “levels of historicity”, the Middle East and
North Africa lie within traditional societies, while Western societies, in the post-industrial 81.
This theory argues that post-industrial societies with the highest level of historicity can produce
cultural models. The reason is the distance that has been achieved by historicity from God,
oneself, and the world as an object. In contrast, traditional societies that MENA lies in, still are
in the middle of the way, being too close to God and thus so involved with religious challenges.
Moreover, traditional societies are far away from creating cultural models that manage how they
function 82.Although new social movement theory is known for its claims of universality, there
have been a lot of caveats suggested by various scholars like Kurzman (2003) regarding the
challenges of applying the new social movement theories to the contemporary movements of the
MENA region.
As the above discussion reveals, the new social movement theory which is framed and
based on the experiences in Europe and North America got evolved along with the democracies
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of the West and importantly, is established based on specific happenings in the United States and
Europe.
Many scholarly articles were referred to arguments and works of Huntington in order to
explain the process of democratization, outcomes and consequences of the Arab uprisings by
help of Democratization Theory. (Stepan and Liz, 2013) In contrast, some scholars try to explain
the uprisings in the Middle East by criticizing the democratic transition theory and instead
focusing on class forces and class analysis83.
According to them, the success of Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings was related to the
strength of labor movement in the country and significant role of workers themselves. This is
what was not present in countries like Syria at the time of uprisings.
Another group of scholars analyze the contemporary movements in the Middle East by
help of Rentier State Theory84. According to them oil-based rentier governments are more
capable in suppressing the governments and support them to stand against the popular uprisings
and protest by using force. The reason is the nature of contemporary movements in the Middle
East is totally different from what happened in the West in the past. Accordingly, although
Western countries are well-known for creating and producing theories related to revolution,
protests, uprisings and social movements in the world, Wester scholars admit that by using the
existing theories, they faced with some shortcomings and even obsolescence for explain the
happenings of the MENA region85 .
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Yet, the literature related to theorizing events and uprisings in the Middle East is not so
rich, and contemporary movements of the Middle East have been analyzed less
academically. Moreover, the fact is that most of the available research related to this topic have
lacked a well-defined theoretical approach to analyze conditions, processes, and outcomes of
these uprisings. What is common among all the available pieces is each writer just uses one or
more variable for analyzing the Middle Eastern movements8687.
This research, however, attempts to explain the uprisings in the MENA region by
combining two categories of theories: structural analysis and political agency. In this way, there
is going to be a more comprehensive research globalization, technology, and international power;
leadership and relationship among states.by having a multivariable study. Reviewing the
structure of state and political system; economic conditions; social and cultural trend, agency of
elites, groups, classes, and social forces; military and ideological factors; the effects of
globalization, technology, and international power; leadership and relationship among states.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NATURE OF MENA MOVEMENTS
The MENA region is a dynamic environment with unique challenges which are different
from the rest of the world. Furthermore, the process and emergence of the events in this region is
not like the other parts of the world. This region, due to its geopolitical condition and natural
resources has been transformed to the heart of the world and was pregnant with some critical
happenings in the twentieth century. The war between Iraq and Afghanistan and the Arab Spring
are the most important ones.
The beginning of the Arab Spring was from Tunisia, but it was able to spread all over the
region in a short amount of time. In this vein, each of the Western and Eastern analysts have
started to look at these happenings from their own point of view and analyze it based on their
preferred theories. Majority of them just called these happenings the process of democratization
and some of them called them the Islamic movements.
However, what has happened in this region contained significant structural changes in a
way that not only transformed the domestic political structure of countries, but also in the
international domain created some major changes in the power exchanges and eventually led to
sustainable effects. Under the influence of these uprisings and movements, people started
practicing democracy and demanding independence in the domestic and international arena. Now
the question is what the reason behind the uniqueness of these movements is and what makes
them different with the other social movements and even the previous social movements in this
region 88.
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As we realized the theories of social movements either classic or modern, fall short in
explaining the contemporary social movements in the MENA region. The main reason for the
inapplicability of these theories on MENA’s movements could be the revision of the nature of
MENA’s movements while theories of social movements either classic or new are west-centric.
Moreover, among the little amount of literature which theoretically studies social movements in
non-democracies or non-western societies the assumptions related to the social movements in the
MENA region never got revised. In fact, there is no model or theory capable of describing the
current amalgam of MENA and the formation of the fruitful social movements in it 89.
Reviewing various social movements in MENA reveals this fact that they are classified
as “exceptionalism” cases with religious roots, fundamentalist nature and far from anything
considered to be idealistic or advanced (Utopian). Scholars like Tilly or Melucci, use terms like
anti-democratic, anti-modern or reactionary for explaining MENA oppositional movements.
Furthermore, the oppositional movements in MENA marginalized in the debate of Islamism and
secularism while most of the scholars always refer to the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 as a
turning point.
However, the fact is the nature of the oppositional movements in MENA has changed
while the environment in the MENA region is still far from utopia and democratization. The
recent mass mobilizations in the MENA region were all about demanding human dignity and
citizenship rights, freedom, justice, and good governance. The transformation of the oppositional
movements in MENA is visible in the slogans of demonstrators, e.g. in Tunisia, “Tunisia,
Tunisia, free, free, in Iran “Where is my vote?” and in Egypt “Enough”. Put differently, after
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three decades, the transformation is obvious in social and political awareness of unrelated
classes, religious and ethnic groups.
The main reason behind the transformation of the nature of social movements in MENA
is related to the demographic change as a matter of a region-wide baby boom which had started
in the 1980s. In Iran, the beginning of Iran-Iraq (1980-1988) was equal to encouraging people to
the expansion of their families by announcing a series of family policies, for national security
reasons which caused a speedy population growth. According to the World Bank, in 2013 the
population of Iran was 77 million with 60% under the age of 30 90.
Additionally, Tunisia experienced a similar thing by the introduction of family planning
programs in the 1990s which created a massive population growth. This occurrence transformed
the country into a young nation which according to the World Bank, in 2013 the population of
Tunisia was 10.5 million with 51% under the age of 30.
The second critical reason related to the transformation of the nature of social movements
in the MENA region is as a matter of population growth especially in Tunisian and Iranian cases,
most of the population are youth which majority of them are university students. Additionally,
students are the most cohesive and efficient group of activists. According to Huntington you one
should search for the most consistent critics of the government at the universities 91.
However, the important point is that most of the unemployment is among the educated
class with a higher level of education. This became one of the main challenges of the MENA
countries such as Egypt. According to data it has been predicted that the current number of
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unemployment which is about 415 million would reach to the number of 823 million people in
2050. Accordingly, the growth number of unemployed youths would increase from 36 million to
56 million in 2050, while the economy of the Arabic countries on average has a growth of less
than 5% annually 92.
According to the above table, the highest number of youth population is related to Egypt.
This number has been increasing since 1985. The important point is that due to initiation of open
economy policies and the presence of youths at the universities, the number of graduated youths
is increasing. These graduated youths try to increase their awareness regarding the political and
economic conditions of youths in other countries through the social media, and this is the
precondition for creation of dissatisfaction. Thus, we should say that the main opposers of the
government were unhappy and unsatisfied youths that were aware of the politics and economy of
the country in contrast to non-educated people 93.
Therefore, the main difference between the current generation and the previous
generation is the level of their education. Additionally, the current generation is far from the
traditional ideologies and are trying to push back any ideology related to the Arab, Islamism, or
nationalism.
Moreover, as a matter of this dichotomy, the main demand of the MENA youths is the
termination of the old order and substitution of the traditional order with a new one which would
recognize democratic and individualistic values. This contrast between the new demand and the
political awareness of people and the social and political context of the Middle Eastern state
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Table 2. Youth Population in Selected Countries

Country

Youth Population94 (Per 1000 total
population)

Percentage of Youth to the
Population

Unemployment Rate

1985

2005

2025

1985

2005

2025

Male

Female

67

110

133

16

15

14

17

27

Egypt

9292

15332

17862

19

21

18

21

40

Syria

2123

4369

5176

20

23

18

16

36

Tunisia

1530

2098

1614

21

21

13

31

29

Yemen

1966

4497

7594

20

21

20

31

14

Bahrain

Source: United Nations World Population Prospects: the 2011 Revision

There is no universally agreed international definition of the youth age group. For statistical purposes, however, the United Nations—without prejudice to any
other definitions made by Member States, defines 'youth' as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years.
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creates a new sociological context. This new context has two main features. Firstly, it tries to
separate religion from politics and secondly, it defines a new sociopolitical plan for governing.
Some scholars by analyzing the recent happenings in the Middle East argue that one theme was
mutual among all of them which was the Islamic revival. Put differently, Islamic ideology which
was initiated by the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979 is transforming from the thoughtless
collective action of following religious groups or clerics to practicing religion individually and
differentiating the religious ideas. The youth generation of ME has realized that a paradigm shift
from the old order to a new one is necessary to produce ideas, reinforce opinions and eventually
initiate effective reforms.
In addition, this paradigm shift has caused a new mindset among the Arab societies that
prefer democratic and open society instead of the radical and totalitarian ideologies, utopian
paradigm, or retrospective beliefs. Yet, some scholars believe that this led to the tendency to live
as a middle class in the public opinion which in contrast to the past is not just related to the
middle groups but most of the poor people of cities and villages also have joined to this new
mindset. This tendency to live as a middle class more than having an economic dimension, is
related tendencies and individual and citizenship requirements. It is a new mindset that reflects
the desire to live in a modern society along its democratic and civilian necessities. The middle
class of the Arab countries were not an important segment of the society and often were under
the influence of Islamic movements. However, the transformations of the society prove the
growth of this segment and their demand for enjoying the rule of law, individual rights, civilian
freedoms, and respect to the human dignity. This new mindset is gradually encouraging bigger
groups of society to support democracy, civilian and individual freedoms, and rule of law.
Governments who prefer to uphold the status quo with old and humiliating ideologies would
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become non-legitimate in public opinion. It can be said, this mindset transformation and
democratic and civilian demands are the reasons behind the expiration of totalitarian, nondemocratic ideologies.
What has happened recently in the Arab world is that a big part of the public opinion
prefers a government who respects rule of law, human dignity, and individual freedoms to
abstract justice which just exists in the religious discourses. This is what proves the fading of the
status of Islam and religious influential organizations among the society.
Moreover, the other impact of this paradigm shift is distancing from the worldview based
on hostility with the West in the name of Nationalism or Islam. Previously, civilians hardly
believed that the West is the major enemy of Islam and the Arab world and most of the society’s
entanglements are related to the conspiracies and Western policies. What we have witnessed
during the Arab Spring and after it, could be a sign of formation of a new generation of social
movements with the institutional differences but some tendencies of the previous decades
persist 95.
For instance, critical changes which can be seen in demographic behaviors of women
like the marriage age, fertility rate is the exact reflection of this significant cultural
transformation are also noteworthy.
There is no doubt that new technologies and social media platforms have changed the
culture of spreading news and information. In this regard, MENA is also not an exception. The
internet despite filtering plays a significant role in transforming the culture of MENA’s
movements. The spread of information through social media and the circulation of regional news
have some key impacts. First, due to the possibility of remaining anonymous most of the online

95

Khosrokhavar, Farhad. New Arab revolutions that shook the world. Routledge, 2016.

52
publishers have no fear of expressing their thoughts and ideas even extreme or radical. Second,
as mentioned earlier, the speed of spreading news and information is much faster. Also, there is
the possibility of accessing websites from all cities in the region. (Moldovan, 2020)96
Accordingly, most of the news which is published in newspapers and other journals is risky and
would easily circulate on the internet. Thus, we can argue that the internet and social media are
essential tools for framing political battles in closed political systems. Accordingly, the internet
is the most influential option for interaction, communication, and mobilization of the social
movements 97.
Finally, successful online political activities could combine online grievances with the
street protests. Although, some scholars argue that the internet would induce solitude in a way
that people limit their fight to online activities, nonetheless, what we learned from the recent
happenings in the Arabic countries was that for a region in which most of the media is under the
strict control of the government and protests are not legalized, the internet is the best and most
accessible channel for the interaction of the protesters 98.
Based on the above discussion and the recent social movements in MENA now it is
possible to conclude that in contrast to what is hardly believed, MENA cases are neither
compatible with the dominant social movement theories and their presuppositions. Nor do they
adapt to the term “exceptionalism” which is a perspective that has been used by scholars like
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Melucci and Touraine for describing almost all the MENA cases as anti-movements with antimodern and regressive engagements.
The amalgam theme of the recent mass movements in the Middle East and North Africa
highlights the necessity for theoretical revision and moving beyond the trans-historical models
and general narratives towards models and theories which account for the exceptionality of
MENA cases and the closed-authoritarian environments in which these movements occur and
progress 99.
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CHAPTER 5
PREVENTIVE FACTORS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE MENA REGION;
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The manifest feature of the Middle East is the political history of it. Factors like the role
of colonization, religion, culture, and tradition have been significantly impactful on the political
structure of the region and have shaped this mutual fate. The disparate structure of the
authoritarian regimes faced a dichotomy along with the globalization and the expansion of
international political interactions. Thus, this dichotomy between the new and old order has
caused many critical socio-political challenges.
Some of the Middle Eastern states have started generating some reformation in their
political structures for withdrawing this crisis. However, based on the historical background of
the sociopolitical structures, these reformations have never been so practical.
Having said that, one of the main issues of the region is the lack of democracy which is a hot
topic among scholars. Although, there have been many efforts for solving this issue (lack of
democracy in MENA), there was no luck so far.
As such, this chapter tries to analyze and examine the obstacles to democratization which
is the main reason behind the unique nature of the MENA and its movements. Also, it is likely to
argue that lack of democracy is what could cause the failure of movements in the region if there
is any.
Democracy by its main definition, which is the outcome of a long and gradual process
has emerged in few countries and in most countries is a new and imported phenomenon. Today,
the importance of democracy is so high that some non-democratic counties try to take advantage
of this phrase to prove the legitimacy of their political systems. In fact, through times, the
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concept of democracy has been transformed to one of the most important and at the same time
ambiguous political concepts 100.
Various political systems in the US, European countries, the single party states in Africa
and the past and present communist regimes or even religious movements all call themselves
democracy. This created lots of controversies among the different political systems to the point
that many of the political systems just present themselves as a democratic system.
Thus, the international organization of UNESCO, launched a conference in 1950 for
clarifying all these debates regarding the concept of democracy with more than 50 countries of
the world. 101 The important point of this conference was that all the participants were declaring
that they have democratic system, but some of them stated themselves as the one and only
democratic system. This conference proved that the definition of democracy in communist
systems is far from the American or European countries. The Western systems at this conference
believed that democracy means free election, freedom of press and media, freedom of political
assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, equality, the right to oppose the government,
the right to choose a job, the right to form free labor unions, the right to travel freely, migrate
temporary or permanently and the most important one, being free from fear and dread 102.
Nowadays all the democratic systems believe that the reason behind establishment of
democracy is creation of political, cultural, and economic freedoms. These freedoms do not
mean spreading financial, cultural, or religious corruption, but are necessary for flourishing the
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abilities of all members of the society. A person should be the protector of the society’s interests
and the society should be the protector of an individual’s interests. This requires cultural
development and elimination of political and economic barriers 103.
The Middle East is one of the regions that has not experienced as much democracy.
However, not all Middle Eastern countries are in the same position. Thus, it is not possible to
give the same rule for analyzing the level of democracy in all of them. Yet, this chapter aims to
first review the features of developing democracy and later study some of the obstacles for
democratization that are all present among the countries experiencing conflicts.

5.1 Democracy Development Indicators
The level and progress of democracy are different in various societies with democratic
structure and system. Accordingly, there are specific features for conceptualizing and measuring
the level of democracy in democratic societies. I am going to mention some of these indicators
below:

5.1.1 Election
Fair and free election in which the main decision-makers in government get selected by
citizens. Yet, it is not possible to call any society with an election a democratic society. Voters
should be able to decide freely and be safe from any governmental threats for voting specific
people. In democratic societies, participation in elections is not mandatory. Although, in

103

McLaverty, Peter. "Civil society and democracy." Contemporary Politics 8, no. 4 (2002): 303-318.

57
democratic societies all adult citizens, parties and groups (even anti-government) are eligible to
vote without voter suppression104.

5.1.2 Freedom of Political Groups and Parties
Groups and political parties assume as one of the key features of the government and the
bridge of interaction between nations and democratic systems. There is no doubt that democracy
could only resist the continuous and active presence of political parties. Political parties in
countries and the competition among them over more power and authority would encourage any
party for trying to increase its acceptance rate and citizen satisfaction105.

5.1.3 Distribution of Political Power
Democratic societies emphasize on the power separation and interaction among the
powers. In fact, this is one of the essential conditions for the formation of a democratic structure.
According to Montesquieu (1977)106, who is well known for his theory of distribution of political
power, liberty would be at its highest level, if all three functions of government- legislation, law
enforcement, and adjudication distribute in different hands107. Parliament should be the reflection
of people’s will and the government should be the executor. preventing any deviation from the
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constitution is legislation’s task. Yet, although democratic societies emphasize the distribution of
political power any of the functions of government should monitor other power’s operations.

5.1.4 Fundamental Freedoms
Freedom of speech, freedom of mass media, civil freedoms, freedom of thoughts and
beliefs, equality of men and women and existence of equal opportunity in politics are all factors
for measuring democracy.

5.1.5 Social and Political Equality
Equality of men and women and the existence of equal social and political opportunities
are among the main features for measuring democracy. Revising the constitution law and
applying it for securing people’s rights is another impactful factor.

5.1.6 Independence of Political Systems
The independence of political systems is necessary for the implementation of social issues in
the best possible way. Since nowadays social issues have become so complicated office cadres
must be specialized. This specialty and necessity happen by a structural variety of political
systems. Accordingly, this structural variety releases the system from any social, ethnic or class
affiliations. Max Weber believes that the rationality of the political system is the best method for
bringing an organization’s power structure into focus108.
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5.2 The Obstacles to Democracy
The Middle East and North Africa are among the regions which have witnessed little
democratic progress. However, not all the countries in the region are in the same position. Thus,
it is not possible to generate the same argument for all of them. The obstacles to democracy are
various and numerous and here I am going to point out to some of them.

5.2.1 The Structure of Tradition
The traditional structure in developing societies would create strong barriers in political
growth and development path. However, the reason behind most of the political issues in these
societies is the disturbing of the traditional structure by the growth factors. The rapid
modernization would cause ruptures in society and politics 109.
Rapid economic development along with the new values which have been created as a matter of
modern technology put the traditional values against the new ones. The growth of civil
organizations in developing societies has created dissimilar values than the traditional norms and
beliefs recast among the young generation. Additionally, most of these values do not apply to
traditional societies and are against them.
The growth of societies with modern values has caused political growth among the
middle class and increased democratic demands. Thus, acceptance of the Middle Eastern
traditional structures has been challenged by these democratic demands.
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However, most of the Middle Eastern regimes for maintaining their traditional authority not only
have defended these traditional norms and structures but also by the help of ideological or even
modern tools tried to strengthen them 110.
In other words, Middle Eastern regimes are trying to represent their political or traditional
ideology, based on power, as a sacred entity which the obedience of that is mandatory.
However, some scholars believe that tradition is not always an obstacle to political growth and
development but could sometimes be effective in the development of the societies. Thus, we can
argue that a combination of some modern and traditional values could be so effective in the
process of political development and weakening of the authoritarian regimes of the region 111.

5.2.2 The Weakness of Civil and Cultural Society
Civil society consists of social organizations, institutions and associations which are free
from any governmental dependency and have a crucial impact on the formation of political
power 112113. In a civil society, non-governmental actors, like political parties, social
development associations, non-governmental organizations, business syndicates and some
interest groups exist. These organizations have the potentials to solve many of the civilians’
issues and, they could work against the system blockades 114.
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Thus, one of the factors that could prevent democratization in the Middle East is the
weakness of civil society in most of the states in the region. Some argue that due to the presence
of colonization in the past and lack of democratic regimes in the presence, currently, most of the
Middle Eastern societies are not ready for the genesis of a civil society which could later bring
democratization.
We must admit that expect for the nature of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East,
there have been some moves towards the formation of civil society and the number is increasing
each day. Nowadays, thousands of non-governmental organizations have become initiated in the
Middle East which even some of them have challenged the governmental structures 115. These
organizations have formed as a matter of economic development, population growth and
increased expansion of the level of education. Unfortunately, although the number of these
organizations is high in the region still, they could not reach the adequate strength and impact.

5.2.3 Lack of Political, Social and Economic Development
Democratic institutions would maintain among the nations that are ready to accept and
exploit them. This preparation needs a level of economic-social and political development.
According to the Humanitarian Development Nexus’s report, the Arab world’s gross domestic
product of 22 Arabic states would not reach half of Spain’s GDP116. This report claims that the
income of one-third of the nations of non-oil Arab states in the Middle East is less than 2$ per
day. In most of these countries most people are below the poverty line and the minority on top of
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it, which proves the authority of a specific level of society. The percentage of women’s
involvement in Middle East politics is so low and only 35% of the seats in parliament are held by
females. The level of literacy and awareness is so low in the Middle East in comparison to the
rest of the world. For instance, in 1996 all the Arabic states with a population of around 300
million, there were only 140 newspapers with 9.2 publications. While, at the same time, in the
United States with a population of around 270 million there were 2939 newspapers with 111
million publications and in East Asia 400 newspapers with 102 publications.
In 2001, internet users were 50% of the population while in the Arabic countries it was just 6%
of the population 117.
Cultural poverty is one of the main obstacles of democracy or the government of people
by people. When people are not aware of their rights for surveillance and intervention in social
and political issues, they will not be able to either use their rights or defend it. As a matter of this
unawareness, an autocrat or an authoritarian class would be able to dominate.

5.2.4 The Compatibility or Incompatibility Between Religion and Democracy
Some scholars believe that the compatibility of religion and democracy is not possible.
They argue that it is not possible to apply all the religious guidelines to everyone in democratic
countries. Relatedly, there is much difference between religious and democratic values, and this
could create incompatibility between democracy and religion.
In other words, it is not possible to put religious and democratic guidelines in one basket.
Some of the radical philosophers in the Middle East, emphasis on the incompatibility of Islam
and democracy and argue that democratic definitions and processes are against the Islamic
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culture. Besides, they believe that the creation of democratic reformations is equal to abolishing
the traditional religion and culture of the Middle East 118. They assume that Islam is the
foundation of Middle Eastern people’s life and thus, there should be an Islamic government to
rule based on Islamic law or Sharia.
As such, based on the arguments of this group of radical Islamists, democratization could
not happen in states with Islamic rules119. The reason is that in the democratic societies power is
in the hand of people, while in Islamic societies people do not have any authority. For instance,
in religious systems equality between men and women or female candidacies for jobs within the
judiciary or the presidency itself might be impossible. There is another group of scholars who
reject the theory of incompatibility of religion and democracy and have another perspective on
this subject matter. They argue that all religions emphasize on equality as the most important
principle of democracy.
According to Tocqueville (1840)120, while democracy reaches a level of unlimited
freedom and materialism, organized religion would be able to control people and prevent them
from unethical acts by promising them heaven and eternality.
This group of scholars also argue that some religious clerics with an extra understanding of
religion can have an updated comprehension of religion. These clerics bring religion to the help
of democracy and prove their compatibility. Accordingly, they believe that this compatibility
already has been verified in modern democratic societies.
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Majority of the people in democratic societies are supporters of religion, and churches and
mosques are actively involved. According to the moderate religious philosophers, there is
nothing in religious beliefs and doctrines that show their compatibility with the corrupt and
authoritarian systems. With this perception, this group participates in the democratic elections or
support democratic institution’s establishment 121.
The reason behind the incompatibility of religion and democracy in the Middle East is
that some of the Middle Eastern societies are still traditional and democracy for them is a new
and unknown concept. In other words, economy, urbanization, modernization, technology,
media, and existing organizations did not exceed the required level for the formation of civil
society and the foundation of democracy. However, the liberal’s attempts along with some
processes could pave the way for introducing democracy to the endemic and religious traditions.
It is possible to argue that what could cause compatibility between religion and
democracy is the separation of religious organizations -which are a part of the cultural
organization- from the political organization. Put differently, the separation of religion from the
government. This separation, which many of the religious and non-religious scholars supports it,
would uphold religion and democracy 122.
The majority of the philosophers believe that the combination of religion and politics is a
dangerous amalgamation and could cause catastrophe for both religion and democracy.
Moreover, witnessing the compatibility between religion and democracy in democratic societies
highlights the fact of separation of religion from the government. Unfortunately, in most Middle
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Eastern countries this combination exists and the majority of the region’s leaders, by improper
use of religion, try to stabilize their political position.

5.2.5 Structure of the Non-Democratic Middle Eastern Systems
Monarchies and religious regimes are still existing in the Middle East region in the states
like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, etc. According to the Freedom House report in 2010,
from the 22 Arabic states in the Middle East 15 of them are among the authoritarian regimes and
the remained 7 states only have relative freedom 123.
The political structures of these regimes were under monarchies for years with tribal and
religious tendencies. Leaders of the Middle Eastern countries use these tendencies as their
political philosophy for ruling and maintaining. These types of political systems prioritize the
interests of individuals or specific groups over the rest of the society or country and avoid other
layers of the society to intervene in their political structure. Thus, these types of systems
recognize democracy as a major threat to the survival of their systems. These systems are always
in battle with modernization and accept modernization to the level that lets them deploy it along
with their benefits. Accordingly, in these systems social and political freedoms are allowed over
conversations about random and minor subjects to distract the crowds 124.
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According to Huntington (1993), the future of these regimes is dark because they are avoiding
modernization and in fact, this avoidance only would make their legitimacy questionable, but
also would weaken the pillars of their throne.125
Authoritarian regimes always try to prevent democratization in the Middle East.
Moreover, for preventing permeation of democracy into their authorities by monitoring social
media and via intimidation, undercover police networks or even sometimes military. However,
confronting the development of democracy as a matter of modernization is not always an easy
task for authoritarian regimes. Thus, they must slow down the process of modernization
sometimes or join the army or give them some leverages to prevent the damages.
Other tricks of these regimes are threatening and marginalizing dissenters from society,
increasing the costs of reformations, suppressing nationalist passion and supporters of democracy
by representing them as anti-religion or westernized. Additionally, by falsifying the possibility of
chaos as a matter of reformation they try to preserve the status quo 126.

5.2.6 Rentier States
The term “rent” defines revenues which are much higher than the normal income. In a
broader context rent points out to revenues which are higher than the income which could be
achieved normally 127. Some argue that rent is the revenue which gets achieve with no effort and
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is in contrast with concepts like wage and interest which are the results of effort and economic
accomplishments 128.
Adam Smith assumes rent as a specific source of income that is different from other
revenues such as wages and profits. This type of income could be achieved by a specific
individual or group with no effort or special productive activity. However, in a healthy economy,
profits and wages are the outcomes of the productive effort. According to Ricardo rent is the
surplus or differential gain. Rent goes to the government’s pocket from the tax on exports, firms,
and natural resources companies. Exploiting natural resources does not need too many human
resources. Thus, the achieved income from the rent instead of getting split among the citizens
goes to the government’s pocket. In this way, it is possible to call any government who achieves
most of its revenue from external or natural resources a rentier state 129.
One of the critical obstacles of democratization in the Middle East is the presence of rentier
states in the region. Middle Eastern governments are active in most of the economic sectors and
furthermore have authority not only on natural resources of the country but also on other
economic sectors.
The reason behind the creation of rent in the Middle East is the existence of a monopoly
over the competition. Access to high revenues with no force for distribution most of it the
interests to business and mine owners or human resources would help rentier states with
economic-political independence in the country. Relatedly, they could make social classes

128

129

Anderson, Lisa. "The state in the middle east and north africa." Comparative Politics 20, no. 1 (1987): 1-18.

Haji-Yousefi, Amir Mohammad. "Iran and the 2011 Arab revolutions: perceptions and actions." Discourse: An
Iranian Quarterly 10, no. 1-2 (2012): 23-60.

68
dependent on themselves and therefore shift the path of social developments in order to pursue
their political interests 130.
Some of the non-oil rich Middle Eastern states, receiving a significant amount of foreign
aid(rent) regularly. For instance, Egypt after the Camp David contract has received 28 million
dollars annually from the United States. In the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, companies are
dependent on treasuries since most of the government’s revenue is from oil. Moreover, since
taxation is not the only source of the government’s revenue, the government is not responsible to
the people and does not pursue political development. Michael Ross argues that there is a
positive significant correlation between the higher individual and firm tax rates and
democratization in countries 131.
Plus, due to the high oil revenues, the rentier states for increasing citizen satisfaction
sometimes offer several economic and social welfare services. However, they just offer services
that could not create any threat towards them or is appropriate for upholding the status quo 132.
Beblavy (2001)133 argues that in the Arab world, specific social and economic interests
are organized in a way that could dominate the major sector of the governmental rent. In these
types of rentier states, new layers of individuals and benefit groups get formed that they also
would create another layer of individuals and benefit groups. As such, the economy would be a
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hierarchy of rentier layers which the government is on top as the main supporter of all other
rentiers in the economy 134.
What is apparent is that the demand for democracy, social and economic development
along with globalization is increasing in the Middle East. This fact has put authorities under
pressure. Inefficient governments have caused massive dissatisfaction due to their tendency of
reacting to people’s demands and needs. Although occasionally some of the states in the region
pretend their applicability with democratic features, the truth is the main obstacle of
democratization in MENA is the authoritarian regimes who try to uphold the status quo. Most of
the time, human wisdom is at a lower level than the decisions of leaders of Middle Eastern
regimes. Thus, controlling these regimes is not possible through the civic organization, mass
media, political parties, and NGOs. Democratic groups always get suppressed and threatened due
to a lack of advertising tools and opposing the authoritarian regimes. In fact, lack of resources
and advertising tools and continuous threats have slowed down the process of democratization in
the region. Also, there is no consensus among the Islamic philosophers regarding the necessity of
democratization in Islamic societies. To plant the seed of democracy in the Middle East, Islamic
philosophers should create a logical connection between the new world order and religious
thoughts by renewing Islamic ideologies 135.
Each society grows differently and political engagement in each society would be based
on norms, values, and historical condition of it. Some of these societies are getting close to
democratization faster and some slower. However, it seems that MENA countries have faced
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numerous difficulties in this way. To get rid of some of these blockades, it is necessary to
increase the level of public awareness in the region to pave the path for reaching a civil society.
Encouraging Middle Eastern regimes towards democratization and formation of efficient
governments through free and fair elections along with economic growth and independent media
could be so impactful on eliminating the obstacles of democracy in the region 136.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDIES; MECHANISMS OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN MENA
So far, in the previous chapters, we have reviewed all theories of social movements and
checked the applicability of some of the main social movement theories on the MENA region.
Accordingly, we realized that theories of social movements, both classic and the new ones, fall
short in explaining the formation and process of social movements in the MENA region due to
its unique context. Moreover, since the presence of democracy is one of the key requirements for
the formation of social movements and MENA has experienced no or little steps towards
democratization, we reviewed the obstacles of democratization in the MENA region in order to
learn about all the preventing factors and barriers of any reformation in the region.
During the Arab Spring, between 2011 to 2013, some states were successful in the regime
transformation while others failed. In this chapter, I am going to review some cases which were
somehow successful among all other social movements in the MENA region to create some
reform like Tunisia and Egypt along Bahrain which was not successful for achieving its demands
and examine their similarities and differences. In this way it would be possible to present a
model for describing the favorable setting and factors for the formation of a fruitful social
movement in MENA.
As we mentioned earlier after the Islamic Revolution of Iran none of the social
movements in MENA were able to achieve their demands towards reformation and
democratization due to the obstacles that have been mentioned in chapter three, ever since the
Arab Spring. Since the Arab Spring does not have a specific leader or ideology, scholars and
Middle East political experts were concerned about the factors and variables which have caused
such massive demonstrations and movements in the region. Relatedly, the political consequences
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of these movements were so critical that the social and political structures of the Middle East
somehow have changed and have brought a chaos and instability in the region 137138139.
Yet, now the question is besides the nature of the MENA social movements that have
been changed in the last decades, what was the reason that the Arab Spring started from Egypt
and Tunisia and no other countries in the region? What features of these two states make them
outliers among all other states in the region? What were the obstacles to success? Lastly, other
than the main assumptions of leading mainstream theories regarding the resources and political
opportunity, what other factors and variables could lead to formation of the social movements in
the closed political environments?
As it mentioned in the previous chapters, there are many theories related to social
movements and revolutions. However, according to Goldstones (2001)140. All these theories just
emphasize influential factors on stability or reformations instead of analyzing the process of
movements. He suggests analyzing other critical variables such as the International system
(economic, ideological, and military factors); interaction between the government, elites, and
civilians; social movement organization; ideology, leadership, cultural identities; gender relation,
besides the structural factors.
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Other than the mentioned factors regarding the Arab Spring, Goldstone believes that the
successful revolutionary movements in the MENA were the ones which could get formed in
Cross-Class coalitions and this is what happened in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.
Although, since there is a debate on classification of the social movements in MENA under
classic or new theories of social movements, Bayat (2013)141 suggests classifying the MENA
movements as “Refo-lutions”. These types of movements in contrast to classic revolutionary
movements happen so quickly and have a reformative, civic, and peaceful nature. Bayat argues
that happenings in Tunisia and Egypt were post-Islamist movements since their demand was
creating a democratic society based on justice. A society where religion and faith at the political
level would combine with rights, freedom and democracy and generate a new form of
government and society.
Many Middle Eastern analysts have similar viewpoints regarding the uniqueness of
Middle Eastern movements. Thus, they emphasize studying various variables at different levels
of analysis to have a broader and more comprehensive understanding about the MENA
developments 142143. As such, in this regard this research in an analytical framework is going to
study internal and external variables at domestic, national, and international levels.
With a meta-analysis of all the previous studies, it is possible to have a comprehensive
understanding about the occurrence of the Arab Spring and happenings in three countries of
Egypt and Tunisia and Bahrain.

141

Bayat, Asef. Life as politics: How ordinary people change the Middle East. Stanford University Press, 2013.

142

Syed, Maria. "Exploring the Causes of Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt." Middle Eastern Studies/Ortadogu
Etütleri 5, no. 2 (2014).
143

Elhusseini, Fadi. "Post Arab Spring Thoughts: The Middle East between External and Internal Mechanisms
(Political Economic & Social Forces)." Hemispheres. Studies on Cultures and Societies 29, no. 2 (2014): 5-29.

74
Thus, first we are going to review the reason behind the formation of the uprisings in these three
countries and break them more through the chapter by using examples related to each variable
and the present challenges in the region.
The beginning of the Tunisia uprising was related to the class division in this country.
The sharp distinction between the upper and middle class manifests itself on December 17th,
2010 when a youth called Muhammad Bouazizi light himself after an altercation, he had with a
security policewoman for confiscation of his food stand. He did this because he was not able to
pay his tax or bribe the police. Occurrence of this happening triggered the Tunisian middle class
and made them aware of the level of discrimination and inequalities in Tunisia. After this
happening, the massive uprisings and street clashes started all over Tunisia. This all led to
overthrown of the Bin Ali’s regime on January 10th, 2011.144
After Tunisia, Egypt entered a cycle of mass protests. Right after the January 25th, 2011
which is the police day in Egypt a massive protest and contentious movement formed in the
country and in the end, it led to overthrown of Hosni Mubarak regime on February 11th in 2011.
The collapse of Bin Ali and Mubarak’s regime paved the way for the public awareness and
formation of political transformation in the region and other countries one by one started to join
the internal war.
Sectarianism in Bahrain was the main reason behind the Bahraini dissatisfaction. The
discrimination and marginalization of the Shia people which are the majority of the population in
Bahrain by the ruling Khalifa family which are Sunni. The uprisings in Tunisia and Bahrain
encouraged unhappy people to stand for their rights. The country faced with the unrest in
February 2011. Demonstrators started to occupy Manama’s Pearl Roundabout demanding
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democracy and an end to the discrimination against the Shia Muslim by the royal family. Now,
after reviewing the main cause behind the spark of the uprisings in these three countries it’s time
to dig in more to analyze the root causes and impactful variables that led to chaos in the region.
By taking a theoretical position towards the previous studies, this research tries to gather all the
mentioned variables in those studies and represents them in a macro-materialist format and in the
end as contribution presents a comprehensive model for unfolding the crucial prerequisites for
the formation of a fruitful movements in the MENA region.
Yet, besides the structural factors such as economic conditions, military construction, and
the position of the International system towards the social movements, this research studies
catalyzers such as the role of groups and media which boost the process of formation of the Arab
Spring and resource mobilization.
In table 3, I gathered all the mentioned variables related to chaos and instability in MENA after
reviewing 21 chosen articles.
According to table 3, scholars who did research specifically related to the Arab Spring,
pointed out one or multi variables as critical and effective. The most mentioned variables which
have caused chaos and instability which eventually led to occurrence of the Arab Spring are
related to two different categories. One category are institutional factors and the other consists of
the facilitators. Variables in institutional factors category are economic crisis, inflation,
unemployment (especially among the educated youths), massive poverty, dissatisfaction among
youths, social and regional inequality, corruption, struggle between the minority group and rest
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Table 3. Factors Involved in Formation of the Arab Spring
Agent Type

Factors
Economic crisis-Unemployment
(specifically among the educated
youths- Inflation

Massive poverty
Institutional
Factors

Youth’s dissatisfaction

Scholar
Jamshidi, 2013145; Yadlin, 2013146;
Dalacoura, 2012147; Perthes,
2012148; Makdisi, 2017149;
Vengina and Ihle, 2018150;
Elhusseini, 2014151; Kinninmont,
2012152
Kinnmont, 2012153; Acemoglu
&Robinson, 2012154
Elhusseini, 2014155; Lynch,
2011156; Halaseh, 2012157
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Table 3. Continued
Agent Type

Factors
Social and regional inequality

Government corruption- Corruption of
leaders and their closed relatives
Resistance of a tyrannical minority
group in response to demand for
political involvement
Long-term tyranny, lack of legitimacy,
Systematic deterrence for reformation
and attaining a new balance
158

Scholar
Lynch, 2011158; Esposito et al.,
2015159; Khosrokhavar, 2016160;
Cammett, 2018161; Dalacoura,
2012162
Acemoglu & Roninson, 2012163;
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Marcobitz, 2014; Dalacoura,
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Table 3. Continued
Agent Type

Facilitators

Factors
Experience of learning and indorsing
democratization and understanding of
proper conditions for urban protests
Minimum presence of NGO’s and
educational support networks such as
“Muslim brotherhood”
The role of civil society activists

Scholar
Bayat, 2013172
Dalacoura, 2012173; Yadlin,
2012174
Khosrokhavar, 2016175

of the society for preserving the status quo, long-term tyranny, lack of legitimacy and experience
of learning and endorsing democratization and waiting for the proper time to apply it.
Repeatedly, facilitators consist of a minimum presence of NGOs and educational networks and
civil society activists.
After reviewing the mentioned variables, we can conclude that there are four actives
challenges in the MENA region. These challenges would literally cause division and breakdown
in the population and would create different sub-groups. Later, these sub-groups will act against
each other or they could even change to organizations or political entities.
The main conflicts which are the feature of modern Middle Eastern societies have been
created around these challenges and their institutionalization. All types of societies are faced
with some sort of challenges. However, the type of challenges, their density and polarization
would have different impacts in social and political sectors. The MENA region is also influenced
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by the present active challenges in it and accordingly the political consequences in the region are
significantly related to these challenges.
Now, I am going to review the active challenges in the dynamic region of MENA.

6.1 Secularism-Islamism
It has been more than 200 years that secularism slightly found its way through the Islamic
world, specially its main sector (the Middle East) and became a dominant ideology in society and
politics. Following the collapse of Othman empire in 1924 and its division to smaller kingdoms,
secular governments have started to arise and rule one by one in these kingdoms. Thus, the
impact of secular perspective and government was marginalizing religion, tradition, and religious
authority 176.
The Western or modern definition of secularism is being against any religious authority
in the society and politics, getting worthless of any tradition and acceptance of wisdom as the
solitary and independent source for all the decisions related to the eternal life 177.
Appearance of secularism as a Western mentality into the Islamic World and its transformation
to an ideology, created bipartisan and challenges in philosophical, social, and political processes
and led to formation of two groups of supporters of secularism and Islamists 178.
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Other than the fundamental opposition of Islamists with secularism, one of the main
catalyzers of the Islamism-Secularism gap in this region is the reaction of the Westerns to the
presence of the Islamists in the social realm. Regarding to the promotion of democracy, Western
countries try to be marginalized Islamists in the political sectors and political stability in this
region is prior to the challenging opinion of the presence of opposition groups in the political
ground. An example would be the full support of the Mubarak against the Muslim Brotherhood
by the United States and Western countries, especially during the first decade of the 20th century.
Put differently, promoting of the democracy by the US in Egypt was in a way that Islamic parties
could not be involved in power and authority 179.
In general, the MENA region with its extraordinary characteristics, undertakes any
conflicts from the tradition vs. modernity point of view. As such, it introduces secularism as the
representative of modernity and Islamism as the representative of the tradition. This is what has
caused two different ideological bases, one in support of secularism and the other in support of
Islamism in this region which has penetrated not only in the mindset of the people, but also in all
the aspects of the people’s life in this sensitive part of the world. Accordingly, supporters of each
side, blame the other for all the issues and lags and try to limit each other’s authority.
Even this challenge was clearly visible in the studied countries in this research. As various
groups like the active Islamists group of Tunisia, Ennahda party180 and Islamic Jihad or in Egypt
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Jihad organization, Hizb ut Tahrir181 and Muslim Brotherhood, and in Bahrain Al Wahdavi and
Al Ekha, oversee the Islamism movement.

6.2 Economic Challenge
Among the social challenges, the economic gap is one of the most common ones.
Throughout history, ideologies like communism has emerged with the claim of eradicating this
gap, but apparently, they did the opposite. Although this gap exists in most of the countries, the
type and distance between its poles are different in different regions and administrations. The
more distance would cause several social crises. The situation is a little bit different in the
MENA region and has created a complicated condition. The dual economy, besides the dual
culture have led to a massive gap and the outcome is a collection of the old social classes like the
nobles, petty bourgeoisies, clerics and peasants against the new social classes like, bourgeois,
intellectuals and the working class. However, it should be mentioned that the role of government
is significantly important in boosting or diminishing the economic polarization among the social
classes or even changing its whole path.
Besides the dual economy, the other characteristic of the MENA’s government is the
given natural resources (gas, oil, etc.), which transform the state to a rentier state. These given
natural resources would change the government to a monopole with dominant power and control
which does not care about the society’s benefits. However, at the same time, these types of
governments try to attract and absorb elites and oppositions, by help of the money from the rents,
in order to maintain their monopoly power. Rentier economy would create a rotary economy
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against the manufacturing economy which the main point in it is having access to the rent and
competition. While in the manufacturing economy wealth is based on working and effort, in the
rentier economy wealth is the product of chance, accident, family and friends’ relationships and
linkage to the authorities 182.
The outcome of all these characteristics would be infrastructural economic problems
which would increase the gap between the rentier groups close to the regime and other parts of
the society. This gap which we can call the “central gap” exists in most of the Middle Eastern
countries and in the long term would create tremendous problems like unemployment, inflation,
inequality and the appearance of a huge gap between wealthy and poor.
Egypt is the most populated Arabic country with a growing GDP. This growth even
increased in the second half of the 2000 decade. As predicted, the constant growth of GDP in the
90s had led to decline of the unemployment rate and malnutrition of the children.
However, during the first years of the new century, besides the continued GDP growth,
unemployment and children’s malnutrition not only stopped their decreasing process but also
started to grow. Both scales had reached a critical point (malnutrition of the children from 20%
to 30% and the youth’s unemployment rate from 205 to 35%). That said, in some countries in the
MENA region, GDP growth had a negative effect instead of being impactful on the civilian’s life
183

.
Inflation in Egypt has always been a structural problem. For instance, it has been more

than 15% during the first decade of the 20th century and reached 18% in 2008. (UNDP, 2009).
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About 4% of the people had a salary less than $2 and around 20% of the people less than $1. The
unemployment rate was 9.4 in 2009 and 9.7 in 2010 in this country. The rich class was a small
part of the society with a close relationship with the authority and Mubarak’s family. In fact,
most people were below the poverty line, and the country was struggling with a huge economic
and class gap. (Eslamee, 2016)184
According to the heritage foundation the economic status of this country in 2012 is as
follows: Egypt’s medium score of 59.1 for economic freedom is on the 96th spot among 176
present countries. Ownership status is not at a great point in this country, official corruption in
the economy is also present at a high point. According to this foundation, unemployment rate in
2012 was 9.6 and inflation rate was 16.2 185.
Tunisia is also one of the Arab-African countries that has experienced a great
achievement regarding the economic scale after its independence. Relatedly, the world bank
announced in 2000, Tunisia has impacted the economic improvement in the MENA region from
the latest 1980s. Besides the economic development this country also impacted some corrective
economic proceedings like privatization of the federal organizations, encouraging foreign
investment, and cutting the subsidies during the first decade of the 21st century.
However, a deeper look at the economic status of this country could prove lots of
fundamental challenges. In fact, reformations have expanded during Bin Ali’s administration, but
these actions doubled the economic inequality and made the poorer class’s life much harder.
Although, these actions created many opportunities for the upper class and even caused the
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benefits directly entered to the packets of elites and few connected groups to the government
which eventually led to enlargement of the class gap and creation of distribution crisis. In other
word, reformations process caused polarization in society and expansion of inequality 186.
The class gap was so visible in this country during the decade prior to the revolution.
There was a sharp distinction between the rich class who were lived in Tunisia’s suburbs and
poor class who were lived in villages and other cities suburbs. (Benstead, et al., 2013)187
Due to the specific attention and allocation of budget to education, the rate of graduation
was so high in Tunisian universities in comparison to other countries in the region and the
country had the highest educated youth population in the region. However, growth and education
rate were not related to the job market or human resources requirements. According to the UNDP
reports of human resource development plan in 2009, during 2005-2006, unemployment rate was
27% in Tunisia while 65% of this number were youths. According to this report, the average
unemployment rate reached from 13.6 in 1980 to 15.5 in 1990 and then to 27% in 2005-2006 188.
According to the Heritage Foundation, Tunisia had the 100 rank in the world regarding
the economic freedom. It continues, investors are not free in this country and they do not have
any control over the credits. Business is more like a monopoly in this country and corruption in
the administrative and economic system is massive. Unemployment rate is 14.7 in this country
189

. As for the Bahrain it is possible to argue that economy was one of the main reasons behind
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the people dissatisfaction of the people in Bahrain: poverty, and unemployment. Bahrain in
contrast to other Middle Eastern countries is not an oil-rich country with a vast amount of oil
resources (except the gifted oil from Saudi Arabia). Accordingly, they ran out of the little
amount of oil they had at the beginning of 90s decade. In addition, the financial aid from the
other countries, especially Saudi Arabia all goes to the ruling family. Thus, the economic
situation is not preferable for the people.
The high unemployment rate has two main reasons:
1- Low level of employment
2- Massive presence of cheap imported workers in Bahrain190
However, despite the undesirable economic condition, the country has an economic potential and
has lots of advantages for absorbing foreign capital. The special business position, aluminum
industry, petroleum and petrochemical industries, and other petroleum products are the main
sources of export income. In addition, this country is one of the most important communication,
telecommunication in the region.
The middle-class youth and university graduates are two groups that were suffering from
rising unemployment in the wake of liberal economic growth. The overall rate of unemployment
before the uprisings was at 10% in Bahrain while the rate of young people was at least 25%.
Moreover, the new labor market applicant just demonstrates about a third of all unemployed
workers in Bahrain which is 62% and the minimum waiting time for a recent graduate to enter
the job market is at least 24 months in Bahrain191.
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It should be mentioned that Bahrain (Al Khalifa regime) has been the main ally of the
Saudi Arabia among the Gulf Cooperation Council. This was a bilateral cooperation. On one side
Al Khalifa regime needs Saudi Arabia support and on the other side, Al Saud needs remaining of
Al Khalifa for stability of Saudi Arabia and keeping Shia’s of Bahrain on the sidelines.
Therefore, the majority of Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with Bahrain is economically to
maintain their influence on the Bahraini regime. For instance, for keeping Bahrain under its own
authority, after depletion of oil reserves in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia offered 100,000 barrels of oil
to Bahrain daily. In addition, after the 1994 crisis in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia assigned the full
authority of Abi Safah oil veils to Bahrain which currently Bahrain can extract and export
140,000 barrels oil from this veil daily. However, the problem is the country became completely
dependent to Saudi Arabia and this caused massive dissatisfaction among the people.

6.3 Tribal and Ethnic Division
Tribal and ethnic division is one of the traditional challenges which have been presented
in the societies which did not finish the civilization period completely and thus it could create the
groundwork for the social conflicts. The Middle East is so influenced by this phenomenon,
although the tribal and ethnic division problem is not limited to just the MENA region. During
the past decades, in countries like Yugoslavia, China etc., the status of tribes and minorities has
become so clear. Moreover, this is a topic that the great powers have been considering for years
and even making their investments based on it.
In general, the MENA region consists of many tribes and languages, which all make this region
so vulnerable. Thus, below I am going to examine this topic by reviewing four countries of
Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia.
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The role of ethnic is so impactful in Egypt. In this country, Christians have chosen
migration under the influence of the Arab Nationalist governments during the past 50 years. The
number of Christians has decreased from 20% in 50 years ago to less than 10%. Christians with
10% and population about 8 million are the second largest religious group after Muslims in the
Middle East region. Although Christians are minorities in Egypt, the point is they have roots in
the Egyptian history. There were times that different administrations were trying to implement
divisive politics between Christians and Muslims in Egypt. However, during the administration
of Muhammed Ali Pasha and Jemal Abd Al Naser, we have witnessed the politics of equality
among all the Egyptians either Muslims or Christians. During the new era and administration of
Anwar Sadat, again, Egypt started to be dealing with divisive politics. As a matter of fact, the
conflicts between the Christians and Muslims were at its highest point at that time. Some
examples are bombing and firing Eyn Al Shams, Al Mina and Al Obur churches during the 1990,
1996 and 2002 years. Thus, some analysts believe that the roots of the recent uprisings and
evolutions in Egypt is related to the bombing of Iskenderian church and death of a massive
number of Christians. Put differently, these happenings created a type of convergence between
the Muslims and Christians with the goal of battling Mubarak’s administration.
After Mubarak’s administration, the conflicts between Christians and Muslims and
Egyptian government were still going on. Thousands of people have been killed in these battles.
Although, they announced shutting down of a church in Asvan one of the states in Egypt, there is
no doubt that there were many other reasons such as existence of lots of tribes and ethnics in
Egypt and their support for specific political groups was one of the main reasons 192 .
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Libya is also a tribal and traditional country. According to reports there are about 120
tribes and families in Libya with high influence in the society. Although, 30 of them are more
active. Also, evidence shows that most of the wars in Libya are tribal wars 193.
After WWII, Libya gained its independence (1952), while there were no political organizations
or power in the whole country. There were attempts for formation of a government under the
authority of King Edris (1952-1969) based on the powerful local families and tribal structure.
Due to the boom of oil, some new types of economic support started to develop separately from
tribes. New center of powers started to form beside the traditional tribal and relative structure 194.
However, with Qadhafi getting to power, the tendency towards tribalism started to
increase. While he was so ambivalent towards tribalism, his ideas were closer to tribalism which
weakened the nature of nationalism. Ideologically, Qaddafi rejected any political role for the
tribes. However, he never rejected the role of tribes themselves and was using them as
facilitators of social security and source of social benefits.
Even, if the impact of any tribe lessened in 1970, tribes were still unofficially activated.
As such, Qaddafi, started to support formation of new unification of tribes, especially against the
big tribes in Cyrenaica which were supporter of King Edris, for protecting the revolution 195.
From the beginning of 1990, while the Islamic groups were still competing against the regime
and the beginning of the international sanctions, tribes were a pressure tool for getting rid of the
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oppositions. Majority of the tribes were encouraged to announce statements against the people
who betrayed the country. While at the beginning of 2011, tribes in north east of Cyrenaica first
started to riot. On the other hand, Berber tribes from the west united rapidly and started to play
an impactful military role in revolution same as the Tebu minority in south 196.
In general, the tribal and ethnic division is one of features of the Libyan society and is what have
prevented this country from transforming to a united nation and instead had led the society to a
tribal division in the hand of authoritarian regimes.
In this vein, the role of Qaddafi is so obvious as some who exacerbates this happening.
He did this by gaining the support of some tribes and eliminating some others. Even, in the
revolution in this country, this division became more obvious after the support of some of the
tribes of revolution and some others of Qaddafi.
Besides the two previous countries, Yemen is also a traditional society where the
behavior patterns of people are under the impact of its tribal structure. According to Burrowes
(2008)197, the remaining heritage of Yemen’s independence is tribes and military which currently
both organs are the foundation of this country actively and with stability. Tribes in Yemen after
its independence, were always one of the powers which entered the political era along with the
military powers. Moreover, their goal was either keep or change the status quo by acting against
the opposition which were under the protection of other tribes. Some examples are after the
independence of this country from Ottomans in coups of 1955, 1945, 1962 and 1967 198.
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Tribes play an impactful role in Yemen. They were always one of the incompatible
powers against the foreign intervention, like the resistance of the tribes against the England
colonization. On the other hand, these tribes were tools for influence of other countries like
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has an old and traditional relation with Yemeni tribes and supports
them financially and with weaponry.
Since 1962, Saudi Arabia has been trying to control Yemen with a tribal republic that has
a weak political structure but at the same time, strong tribal structure. According to Burrowes,
the most important outcome of the Saudi Arabia’s strategy against Yemen is spreading tribalism
in all the organizations, especially the military. Accordingly, this tribalism was more beneficial
for northern tribes and not the southern ones199. The dominance of the tribal beliefs and ideas on
the society’s culture is what would create internal ethnic and tribal conflicts. Sometimes as a
matter of tribal conflicts regarding a piece of land or social issues, business or etc., or even
personal issues, in the case of tribal killings; And this would lead to tribal killings. Head of the
tribes believe that these happenings are all the result of lack of law, weakness of justice and
dominance of tribal beliefs. (Aliboni, 2011)200. This situation would also decrease the
government’s authority at national level and increase the influence of the tribal leaders in the
political structure.
Saleh’s regime was one of the regimes after the 1962 revolution, which actively was
trying to empower the political power of the tribes and support them. According to Khaled, this
behavior could increase the gap between the ethnics and tribes and put them against each other.
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On top of that, the presence of the Zaidi Shias and Houthi’s tribal rebellions might be the most
challenging outcomes of the ethnic and tribal division in the Middle East.
Tunisia, similarly, to other Middle Eastern countries in regards to ethnicity, has a
heterogeneous society. Although it does not have a sharp ethnic division in comparison to the
other Middle Eastern countries, since it was the destination of many immigrants throughout
history, it has ethnic diversity. Although the majority of Tunisian are Arabs and Sunni (99%) but
according to the genetic research, the ethnic population of Tunisia is not homogenous and is a
combination of various races that migrate to North of Africa, from Asia and Europe. As such,
people who live in North of Tunisia are a mixture of Barbarians, Roman, Vandals, Cartagena,
and Arabs. While the people in middle and south parts of Tunisia are more Barbarians. In fact, a
complex of various ethnics with different cultures are living together, that due to the traditional
pattern of the society, have divergence potential 201. In a nutshell, the current Middle East looks
like a 40-piece ball, that each of its countries are influenced by their ethnic divisions, and in
between, the unreasonable actions of the governments would sharpen the gap and create severe
polarization.
Among all the involved countries in the Arab Spring the case of Bahrain is unique
regarding the sectarianism and ethnic division. On one side there is a sharp discrimination
between the Al Khalifa family and their relatives with the rest of the society and on the other side
the widespread religious discrimination between the Shia and Sunnis. While the majority of the
country are Shia (60%), the ruling family are Sunni. There are two divided society in Bahrain:
one is the society of rich ruling family, diplomates, business owners and the other one the poor
society which contains people in poor neighborhoods and suburbs. Al Khalifa family members
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are always prior to others and there is not such a thing as meritocracy. Additionally, in the
Bahrain society the distinction against the Bahraini Shias is the point which they were always
under the discriminatory behavior and being marginalized by the ruling system. This in fact has
caused a serious dissatisfaction for the Bahraini Shias which are the majority of the society.

6.4 The Administrative Challenge
One of the most impactful challenges on the political culture of the Middle East is the
presence of the military in the political arena of the countries of this region. The special
privileges of the military members in politics and the fear of occurrence and formation of a coup
in these countries, have made the process of democratization problematic. Moreover, because the
existence of a complete democracy in a country has a negative relationship with the reduced
military’s power, the political process of this region, has been moving towards an incomplete
democracy during the 20th century and the first decade of 21st century 202.
This challenge has created a vicious loop in the domestic politics of Middle Eastern countries,
which by moving of the military towards the political arena, the half space of the civil society
gets closed and with the moving of civilians towards taking this position back, the military
members are driven back to the camps and military centers. This process is what is happening in
most Middle Eastern countries.
There are various arguments about the presence of the military in the political arena.
Jowitz believes that interference of the military is one cause of political instability. The more
military intervention, the more political instability. On the other hand, Huntington and Pearl
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Muter argue that the formation of institutions (partisans, legislative parliaments) would reduce
military intervention. Huntington by arguing about the excessive or abusive political influences
of the armed forces in a country states that, praetorianism is one of the features of a country that
not only the military but also other social members intervene in the political affairs. The reasons
that pushed the military towards political intervention are hidden in the society’s structure. These
reasons are mostly related to the lack of weakness of the political organizations 203.
The presence of the military in the political arena has a long history. However, this specific
status of military in MENA forms as a matter of the role of military in independence and
government building in these countries. The military leaders of Egypt (1952) and Libya (1969)
took power by coup d’état. Although, what is clear is that in majority of the MENA countries,
the military is loyal to the regime instead of the nation or the democratic system 204.
In Egypt, among the 18 cabinets which had formed during the 1952-1970 years, only
leaders of one of the administrations which remained less than 2 months were not military
members. Only 3% of the first cabinet consisted of non-military officials and the next 15
cabinets were all combinations of about 36% military and 64% civilians. Accordingly, the most
critical positions offered to the military members. Naser was chosen for leadership 8 times and
all the president’s deputies during Sadat and Naser’s administration were military members.
Enterprises of all the major ministries and presses like Al Ahram or Al Helal were in the hands
of the military members. According to Carothers, 2002, Egypt entered a gray political zone after
the 90s which its main features were a limited political space for different parties and the civil
society’s institutions, lack of public trust to the government, repeated abuse of law by the
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government, supporting of the weak organizations by the government and political interfering of
the armed forces 205.
The presence of the armed forces in the political arena and the military-civil society gap
is clearly visible in the recent years in Libya. The way that Qaddafi took power, and the way he
treated the military during his administration, all show the bold role of the military and armed
forces in the society and lack of even half-space civil society in this country. He owed his power
in Libya to the military’s 1969 coup. In this year, some of the military officials ousted Edris by
the order of Muammar Qaddafi who was 27 at that time, and later formed
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 206. During his administration there was no civil
society. The political system of Libya at his time instead of relying on the civil society, parties,
groups, and political institutions was based on the military and tribal support, completely
authoritarian. Formation of parties and civil society was forbidden, and oppositions got
suppressed by the military207. He was so against the civilian organizations, which he believed
regarding the parliaments that it is a hoax against the nation and the parliament regimes are using
cheating tricks for solving the democracy problem. Moreover, regarding the public elections he
believed that it is a trick and something like a modern dictatorship 208.
Qaddafi, with all these assumptions, started to exclude all the opposition groups and other
civil groups by help of the military and armed forces during the 1980-1990. The role of security
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powers was so bold in excluding the civil groups in Libya, that they sometimes traveled abroad
to eliminate opposition forces. In the meantime, what is visible in Libya after Qaddafi more than
the previous administration, is the increased role of armed forces and decreased security after the
revolution. As such, it is possible to argue that this is what led to sidelining of civil society, or in
other words, under shadowed it by growth of the military after the revolution.
In Tunisia, the role of the military for domestic security and elimination of the political
opposition groups was so critical from the independence of this country till 2011. The military
was the main trustworthy organization and was the perfect tool for political manipulation and
advancement of the authoritarian regime’s goals. The political manipulation of the military
became clear, particularly during the first decade of 1970, with suppressing the anti-government
demonstrations. Since the officials of this country had no role in the government formation or the
independence movement, like the leaders of the neighbor countries, they did not have a
charismatic image and thus, were so dependent on the military. The military from the end of
1970 and the beginning decade of 1980 tried to suppress all the unions and Islamic groups with
the help of security forces.
On the other hand, Bin Ali’s kind of coming to power in Tunisia, clearly shows the
impactful role of the military in the political arena. He took power in 1978 by help of the military
and coup d’état and by ousting Habib Bu Raghibeh, the first Tunisian leaders after the
independence. Due to his security background and support of the military for taking the power,
during his 23 years of authoritarian rule, he let the armed forces and security forces occupied all
the positions and departments,
Although, after taking power, he announced that he will decrease the political role of the
military, will put the armed forces under the order of non-military forces and will create some
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reformations, during his administrations he could not fight against the massive influence of the
military. As such, the military and armed forces suppressed many of the civilian forces like the
Islamists, the liberals and unions and forced them to abandon the country.
Bin Ali believed himself as a civil reformer, while under his administration none of the
lefties or Islamists had any rights and were under attack frequently 209.
Moreover, the government was under the order of the military and based on their demands was
violating the citizen’s rights, limiting freedom of speech, presses and communications by using
force and fear tackles. A set of actions like the judiciary system, traveling controls, arbitrary
arrests for weakening the human rights and apposition groups in the end caused the Amnesty
international organization to accuse Bin Ali’s regime for human rights violation in 2010. (U.S
State Department, 2010)
The West’s support of the military of this country had a massive impact on the human
rights violation and decrease of the civil freedoms and elimination of the civil institutions.
Tunisia was among the 10 countries that was on the top of the US’s list of sale of military
weapons after 2002 for preventing terrorisms. The United States named this country during the
Bin Ali’s administration as a key country for preventing terrorism. Supplies and facilities which
the U.S gave to Tunisia since 2003, all display the growth of militarism and the increased role of
the military in politics, especially the civil arena. The U.S sale of military weapons to Tunisia
was consist of helicopter, machine gun, parachute, body armor, night vision device for snipers,
drone and etc. 210.Tunisia was among the 20 countries which has received international military
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education since 1994. In addition, the amount of the funds for the U.S military aid to Tunisia
2008 was 21500 million and in 2009 was more than 23800 million dollars. (DSCA, 2011)
In 2003, Tunisian parliament passed the inclusive anti-terrorism law. After passing this
law, about 2000 people arrested for terrorism. These actions caused the critics to argue that
demanded freedom is equal to terrorism in this country 211.
In general, during the 23 years of Bin Ali’s administration, the civil society got destroyed step by
step by the armed and security forces. The parties, NGOs and various medias were
overshadowed by the armed forces activities and the military was suppressing any democracy
process by calling it terrorism.
The position of the military in Yemen is related to the critical role of its members during
the independence of the country from the ottoman. In Yemen, the regime was on the one hand
dependent on the military for maintaining itself and on the other hand was worried about the
coup d’état from the military side.
The weak economy, the tribal and torn structure and the weakness of the organizations all
were amplified the need for the military to deal with the society 212.The growth of the military at
the beginning of the independence, led to occurrence of continued coups in the next decades and
transformed the country to a country which uses military response for any democratic political
actions and elimination or suppression for any civil movements. The continued coups in Yemen
all prove the dominance of the military in the political arena and the weakness of the civil
organization in leading the social and political processes. The set of formed coups in Yemen
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displays the sharp gap between the military and the civil society and in general dominance of the
military on all the social aspects. Examples are the 1948 coup which led to assassination of
Imam Yahya by an Iraqi. Later, Abdullah Bin Ahmed became the leader. On the side, Imam
Yahya’s son in response to the 1948 coup, entered Sana’a and executed all the people involved
in the coup by help of his tribal supporters. Again, an unsuccessful coup happened in 1955 by Al
Talayeh, which happened again in 1962 by Abdullah Salih by help of the Egyptian forces. The
outcome was the end of Imam Ahmed regime and the start of Yemen republic system by
Abdullah Saleh 213.
After the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from Yemen, there was another coup by the
tribes’ leaders and the military against Abdullah Saleh in 1967 which led to ousting of Saleh and
Ghazi Alriani the only non-military leader of Yemen took power. However, as a matter of
another coup in 1974, Ibrahim Al Hamdi took power. He was a military guy with modern beliefs
which was insisting on marginalizing the tribal forces and improvement of independence of
national sovereignty. He believed that the military is only a national organization. As such, he
started to eliminate all the tribe’s leaders. After 3 years he got killed by the Saudi Arabia’s order
and the military took the control of capital. After the alliance of both north and south Yemen and
formation of the current Yemen, the first president was again chosen from the military members.
This was again the beginning of the conflicts between the southern and northern forces 214.
As for Bahrain, since the country was so weak regarding the military defense and
security, it was obliged to make military agreement with superpowers. One of the most important
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ones was the military agreement with the United Sates and offering the Al Jafr military base to
the United States in 1971. This base was built by English people in 1935 and after they exit it
was given to the United Sates in 1971. Other than that, the United State has two more military
bases in Bahrain, and for this reason thousands of American soldiers are living in Bahrain with
their families. All these are the reasons behind the separation of military and the civil society in
Bahrain and Bahraini people’s dissatisfaction.
However, what is worth mentioning is the military’s intervention is what is destructive in
the MENA region. According to Huntington it is a preventive interference. He argues, there are
two types of military interference. The first one happens at the times when the matter is the
potential or close winning of a party or a movement in election or when the winning party is the
representative of a group which the military wants to keep away from the political arena.
The second one happens when a regime starts performing radical policies or relies on groups
which the military does not want them to become powerful 215.
However, eliminating the civil society and parties and organization, is the outcome of the
military’s activities in the Middle East.
Yet, this research aims to suggest a new model by presenting other impactful factors
regarding the proper way of analyzing MENA movements and revolutions. Thus, a multi-level
and multi-variable analysis is what will be used in this research to analyze happenings and
reforms in Tunisia and Egypt which were the initiators of the recent movements in the MENA
region and were successful in achieving their demands for the time. Theoretically, this research
will use a macro and materialist approach for analyzing the conditions which the Arab Spring
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occurred in. The mentioned approach will put “political process theory” and “resource
mobilization theory” at the center of analysis.
This research theoretically believes that Tunisia and Egypt had similar structural
conditions which at a historical moment and as a matter of one or multi catalyzers led to the
street protests. These street protests were strengthened by facilitators and formed an uprising
movement and eventually with the help of some key determinant factors the reformation
occurred. The used variables in the analysis will be mentioned shortly. However, the case was
different for Bahrain. In the next chapter we are going to point out to the obstacles of Bahrain
success.
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CHAPTER 7
ANALYTICAL APPROACH
My research is based on a comparative case-centered method. With this method, I am
going to analyze political, economic, social, cultural, military, and international factors involved
in the occurrence of the Arab Spring. The combination of these factors is what is important in the
positive or negative outcome. Relatedly, these factors all have impacts on each other positively
or negatively.
The main hypothesis for selecting these three cases is that the presence of some
similarities between Tunisia and Egypt has caused these two countries to become starting points
of the Arab Spring and not the other countries in the MENA region. Accordingly, Bahrain is
chosen as an unsuccessful case with some unique features which this combination would be
helpful in generating the most impactful variables on variation of the social movement outcomes
in MENA. As for the cases, with the help of the results of chart 1, the similarities between three
countries will be reviewed. Moreover, I have added 9 more factors which I found critical in
causing and evolving the Arab Spring will be discussed in detail. As for the institutional factors
other than the studied variables in the previous research related to the Middle East, I have added
4 more variables.
For facilitators I studied the role of labor unions and NGOs along with the role of culture
and social media. Moreover, I added another category of determiners, factors which in my
opinion could have a significant impact on determining the direction of the MENA social
movements. They are the leader’s performance at times of crisis, police forces and military
position and lastly the foreign intervention.
•

Institutional Factors:
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1- Clash between expectations and reality
2- Public’s distrust in government
3- Sedimentation of the present ideology
4- Social, political, and economic instability
•

Facilitators:
5- The role of oppositions
6- Role of culture and social media

•

Determiners:
7- Leader’s performance at the times of crisis
8- Police forces and military position
9- The foreign intervention

Thereafter, the correlation between the mentioned variables will be examined by help of the
selected cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain and later the results will be stated.

7.1 Institutional Factors
7.1.1 Clash Between Expectations and Reality
One thing that became a critical issue in Tunisia and Egypt in long term was feeling of
humiliation and relative inequality216. “Enough” movement occurred as a matter of reaching
serious proportions of handling problems and chaos all over the society and also the “Dignity”
movement was a result of humiliation feeling among the people. People were annoyed since they
have not had a proper answer to their needs and demands in the recent decades. Moreover, the
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international system did not treat them well as a Muslim or Arab specifically after the September
11th incident 217218219.
Regarding the poor economy as one of the critical structural factors of the Arabic
revolutions it should be stated that although during the years prior to the Arab Spring, Tunisia
and Egypt both had experienced economic development 220, but the level of relative deprivation
and dissatisfaction among the youth have been increased between 2009-2010 years and thus, the
level of their happiness has been decreased 221. Relatedly, during the years prior to the
revolution, there was no increase in national income in these countries by means of better split of
the incomes as a result of increased poverty level due to the massive corruption and social
inequality in the society 222223224.
According to the Gallup survey, the number of people who felt prosperous and lucky in
2010 in Tunisia and Egypt decreased in comparison to 2007. In addition, the lowest level of
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satisfaction was related to these two countries beside Syria, Morocco, and Yemen among the
Arabic countries in the Middle East. (Amin et al., 2012)225
As such, it is possible to argue that the formation of the protests was for purposes like
maintaining dignity, justice, and elimination of deprivation 226227.
In a nutshell, it is fair to argue that a combination of factors like political limitations, lack of
freedom, long experience of economic pressure with increased relative deprivation feeling and
formation of corrupt regime mindset, among the people, were all created the foundation of a
considerable controversy.

7.1.2 Public’s Distrust in Government
As much as the importance of people’s basic rights, feeling of freedom and the benefits
of citizenship rights are significant too. Having a full stomach, without feeling free would lead to
dissatisfaction. That is why many believe that putting legitimate freedoms in danger, in the end
would jeopardize livelihood in the society 228. The turning point was the time when people
became aware of the corruption of the officials. The gap between rich and poor was increasing.
People started to believe that officials only cared about their own benefits and just used people as
a tool for reaching their own targets. Presence of defiance potential, humiliation and feelings of
deprivation reached the point that the corrupted image of leaders like Ben Ali, Mubarak,
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Gadhafi, Assad’s family and Ali Abdullah Saleh shaped in public minds and people started
blaming them for mishandling the political power and fraud. Yet, this was not far from the
reality.
As for Ben Ali, according to wiki leaks in 2006, about half of the Tunisian business elites
were in direct contact with Ben Ali himself. In addition, “The family” in the political culture of
Tunisia was known as a financial network which was family based, Ben Ali’s 3 oldest sons, 7
grandkids and 10 brothers in law 229. This situation was ongoing, while the unemployment rate

Table 4. Middle Eastern Countries with Highest Corruption Perceptions Index Rate
Country

Corruption Perceptions Index (%)
(2011)

Bahrain

51

Tunisia

41

Egypt

32

Syria

26

Libya

21

Yemen

15

Source : https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/table

among the Arab youths during 2005-2010 was 25% which is one the highest rates in the world
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According Banaszak231, successful revolutionary movements are usually those which
form cross class coalitions. Regarding the political structure in Tunisia and Egypt and the role of
government in economy and society, during the uprisings lower- and middle-class people
mobilized against the government and religious leaders and intellectuals joined them. Massive
corruption and bribery of the government and related officials were always presence (Acemoglu
& Robinson, 2012)232. Despite the massive poverty in Tunisia and Egypt, the judiciary and
people were always among the accusers 233. Mubarak, however, lost the support of most classes
except a part of the upper class. Moreover, after the self-immolation of Bouazizi234, many people
started blaming Ben Ali and his relatives.
Mubarak and Ben Ali at the beginning of 2011, saw themselves completely alone in front
of the wave of revolutionaries since their social support was just limited to a small part of the
society. Bahrain has a long history of government’s fake promises to Bahraini people. In 2001
the king promised to respond to the oppositions demands in a referendum. However, the king
reneged his promises. Again in 2002 he announced a new constitution in which he centralized
power in his hands. Although this constitution brought parliament to Bahrain but at the same
time it manipulated the system. It literally manipulated the constituencies, so that the opposition
votes were somehow trifling. In other words, the parliament made the king’s existing power a
triple veto system. Later, the government naturalized large numbers of poor Sunni Arabs from
Syria, Jordan, and Yemen in order to marginalize the Shias of the country which were 70% of
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the population. Accordingly, they hired lots of non-Bahraini people for creating a secret army to
be prepared for future challenges. As the years went by the political naturalization decision of the
government created serious negative impacts such as unemployment, increased sense of
xenophobia among Bahrainis and higher demands for homes and essential needs which were
already far from reach of the working class.
Additionally, lots of the king’s family controversies began to leak to the public. The most
scandalous one was related to the transaction between the prime minister and a businessman.
When all these happening became public knowledge people realized the government has no
intention in in reforming the rigged political system. The happenings strengthened the distrust of
people in their own government and a lot of anger and annoyance began building up which
eventually, sparked the unrests for standing against the government to achieve the old demands.
However, after the occurrence of the unrests, the protesters were suppressed by security guards
and the secret army in March 2011 when the king declared a state of emergency. He brought
troops from Sunni-led neighbor countries to restore order and silent dissent. The uprisings led to
death of at least 30 civilians and 5 policemen, and arrestment of about 3000 people.

7.1.3 Sedimentation of the Present Ideology
Political ideology like any other novel social phenomena after becoming institutionalized
could lose its influence and inspiration in time. Thus, all the efforts for preserving it could be
impractical. This is what Edmond Husserl calls “Sedimentation”. Put differently, sedimentation
occurs while a social phenomenon, belief or ideology turn into an unchanging routine and do not
trigger any sensation 235.
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At the time of sedimentation, the current ideology would be at a point where there is no
practical action against or in support of it. As such, the ruling system would try to preserve the
status quo outside that ideology by help of tools like force, violence, or any other mechanism. At
this phase, the ruling system would be in danger since its ideology will lose its resource
mobilization power and the regime’s strength for confronting the internal and external threats
will decrease.
It seems that during the recent decades, especially after the Camp David treaty on
Sep17th 1987, Arab nationalism ideology entered the sedimentation phase. In fact, during the
last decades, rulers of states like Egypt that were mobilizing by relying on Israel, Arab unity, and
nationalism in order to convince people to support them, have lost their former strengths and
tools.
Additionally, the collapse of Iraqi Ba’athist regime in 2003 and the beginning of the
proxy wars in the region in which Iran and Saudi Arabia were the main players of it, have
lessened the strength of Arab nationalism and impacted religion and sectarianism.
One of the critical weaknesses of the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes was the lack of religious and
ideological backup in the absence of legitimacy and democratic mechanisms. With the start of
intense street conflicts in Egypt and Tunisia between the people and government forces at the
pick of legitimacy crisis, no one had the ideological power to defend any of these two and there
was no volunteer for sacrificing his life, social and economic benefits for Ben Ali or Mubarak.
Ben Ali was not able to count on anyone’s ideological commitment and no one was there for
Mubarak after he got ousted and feared to remain in the country.
Generally, it is fair to argue that the ruling ideology in Tunisia and Egypt by no means
was tied to religious and fundamental values of the society. Clerics and religious leaders either
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joined people in the movements or at least did not defend the government. In Tunisia, religious
group of Al-Nahza by Ghannouchi leadership and in Egypt Muslim Brotherhood supported the
revolution and later Salafist groups also joined them.

7.1.4 Social, Political and Economic Instability
Tunisia and Egypt both have an economy based on tourism. As such, any chaos and
insatiability in these countries would affect the number of tourists and the government’s
revenues. At the time of instability, the maintenance fee of the political system would increase,
and the government would not be able to resist so long against the reformation waves. The
reason is these types of regimes do not have enough financial resources for keeping the military,
security, and enforcement forces in the scene. Moreover, they would face difficulty in paying the
government employees which could also impact dissatisfaction. This scenario is different in the
rentier states.
During the instabilities known as the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia injected funds to various
sectors of society, gave benefits to employees, increased the amount of loans, hired about 60,000
new forces to the Ministry and assured construction of 500,000 houses for poor people, and as a
result not only ran-away from the contentious cycle but also guaranteed its own security 236237.
This was exactly what Mubarak and Ben Ali’s regimes were deprived of.
In fact, the chaos was originating from the non-oil states. It is thus apparent that during
the crisis, most of the time, countries benefited from their economic strengths. Oil-rich countries
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like Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman were able to silent the protests by increasing
employee’s income, creating new job positions, increasing subsidies and cash payment to
citizens. This was the crucial point of the remaining of the Persian gulf’s oil-rich kingdoms 238.
The only exception among the oil-rich countries was Gadhafi’s regime which could not
use oil revenue for calming down the mounting protests. The overthrow of Gadhafi’s regime
with oil resources backup, occurred with the NATO air coverage and international interventions
239

.
Another point worth mentioning is that authoritarian countries which have an economy

based on tourism should have an interaction with the rest of the world and adopt less strict social
and cultural rules inside the country. Also, they must provide more facilities for the entrance and
departure of the tourists and be more flexible. In this situation, it is possible that police strength
and suppression power decreased and the setting for formation of popular uprising became
necessary. In this regard, Tunisia and Egypt which were in good terms with other countries
especially the United States and Israel, could not reach the same level of suppression power
against the contentious potential as Iraq at the time of Saddam or Libya and Syria. This was one
of the critical reasons that the Arab Spring had started from Tunisia and Egypt and no other
states in the region.
In fact, the level of a country’s dependence to revenues and economic resources outside
of the country could impact the government’s performance. For instance, many Egyptian
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workers are working near the Persian Gulf and sending tremendous amounts of money back
home 240.
Prior to 2011, this issue caused banning of countries which were struggling with
economic crisis from this privilege, in order to show severity of action against the platforms like
“Aljazeera” and “Al Arabia” which were supported by Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s administrations.
At this point, it is not even possible to tolerate foreign interventions while a part of the
government’s authority in managing the country and preserving the status quo is based on
foreign revenues. Thus, the government had no other choice to deal with the interferers and even
sometimes asks for their support. So, it is apparent why Ben Ali ran to the Saudi Arabia and
during the crisis Mubarak also got an offer to move to the Saudi Arabia with his family.
Regarding the impact of foreign financial resources, we can point out to the effect of foreign
loans on the political stability of Ben Ali and Mubarak’s regimes. In 2010, Egypt was the biggest
foreign assistance receiver for investment in trade division after India and Afghanistan.
Relatedly, 70% of the mutual assistance and 40% of the whole foreign assistance was related to
the United States and Germany. Later, Tunisia and Egypt started increasing taxes to pay for their
debts, which was an extra pressure on society. (UN, 2012)
According to Smith, (2011) 68.7% of the whole foreign assistance money was related to
the United States itself. He argues that there was a close relationship between the US military. In
addition, the US had a great political influence on both Egypt and Tunisia. This could be selfexplanatory that while the US government and president demand change of Mubarak, the process
of power change has happened much faster.
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Regarding the Social factors, many of the MENA states were struggled with social
matters like population growth, the ratio of youth’s number to the whole population, social gap,
discrimination, and corruption 241. These issues were the most important factors for the public’s
dissatisfaction with the system. Majority of these countries have ethnic or religious minorities or
there is a social gap in the society for sectarian reasons.
Thus, Middle Eastern states which experienced a significant gap between majorities and
minorities were on more of a favorable ground and got involved with the wave of opposition
protests earlier 242. In Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya part of the society that believed were
victims of discrimination occupied the streets.
However, the interesting point is that revolutionary movements were successful in those
states with less heterogeneous and unified populations. Relatedly, the success achievement was
much faster in states with more unified populations and less religious and ethnic social
differences. Tunisia which was the first state in the Middle East that witnessed the first victory
has a more homogeneous population in comparison to Yemen which was the last one 243.
The fact is, in the Middle Eastern states with a significant gap between minorities and
majorities, the governments- either from the majorities or minorities have seen more resistance
and were able to preserve the status quo until now; Although this resistance which is based on
the government’s dependence on the minorities, seems fragile.
The social gap has caused by one group assumes their interest is dependent on upholding
the status quo. Thus, they support the system until the last minute with the help of the military
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(which recruits most of its members from the same group). This was the case in Syria and
Bahrain. In contrast, in Tunisia and Egypt, massive protests formed among various social classes
against the government. In these two countries the social gap was not significant, and no group
had specific ties or interests in the government, no group considered itself as a loser in the fall of
the regime 244.

7.2 Facilitators
7.2.1 The Role of Culture and Social Media
One factor that played a critical role in creation of the domino effect in the Arab Spring
was culture. Following the protests in Tunisia and inspired by them, opposition in some African
countries like Djibouti and Uganda, Asian countries like Maldives, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, even China and European countries such as Albania, Croatia and Spain started some
protests against their governments. None of them were able to be continuous like the Tunisian
movement. The fact is, the Arab Spring wave which began with the overthrow of Ben Ali only
occurred in the Middle Eastern countries which was the outcome of the presence or formation of
a united culture and identity that was facilitating uprisings from on Arabic country to another.
(Lynch, 2011)245
After the success of the Tunisian people in ousting their ruler, people in other Middle
Eastern states assumed they would be able to do so as well. Similar slogans illustrate the impact
of this shared cultural factor. However, the feeling of a shared identity during the 2011 to 2013
events was different from the Arabism in the 1960 decade with the leadership of Jamal
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Abdunnassir. The demand was not changing the political borders of the region and formation of
a united Arab country; Besides, instead of pointing to foreigners and international powers, it was
targeting rulers of the Arab’s world itself 246.
Relatedly, regarding the sub-Arabic cultures, countries with most comparable cultures
had a significant impact on each other. For instance, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya which were the
outliers in the protests, were neighbors and shared same north African Arabic sub-culture.
(Gregg, 2005)247. Regarding the culture, another important factor was the role of technology and
social media. Television channels like Al -Jazeera248 , social media platforms like Facebook,
Tweeter, YouTube, and cellphones all played key roles in the occurrence of the Arab
movements.
Many scholars argue that, factors such as discrimination, social injustice, political
autocracy, poverty, and economic inefficiency were always presence in the region. However, the
new factors which worked as facilitators were technology and social media 249.
Regarding the impact of the internet and social media as a tool for social movement
mobilization there are two different arguments. Some scholars like Lerner emphasize the
negative impacts of the internet on the social movements. They believe that publishing and
distributing information through the internet would not create enough social capital and social
bonding for constant social movements on the path of democratization. In contrast, the public
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access to the online information that is generated from the non-accurate, non-organized and
outspread sources, could only cause confusion. Moreover, replacement of the virtual world with
the real world and face to face interaction could slow down the process of cohesion and
mobilization which is important for any social movement.
Although, Lerner believes that the combination of the internet and social media with the
real-world engagements could create positive impacts. Accordingly, in a closed political system,
the cyber environment could facilitate blocking out the information and reduce the risk of public
social interactions 250.
Some other scholars and political activists argue that new methods of communication and
information could create a revolution in the way of civilian’s interaction with their governments.
A majority of them who belong to the western democratic countries believe that social media
would enforce authoritarian regimes to be more responsive to their societies. In this regard, first
cell phones, then weblogs and now social media are the common tools for the oppositions in the
dictatorship systems.
The western analysts even believe that the new media would convert to the new wave of
democratization 251. Even though they do not pay attention to the limitations and censorship in
the dictatorship systems.There could be a moderate perspective in between regarding this topic
which is closer to my own opinion. It is possible to argue that although these new medias will
not cause the end of dictatorship in the Middle East, they would accelerate the democratic
transformations.
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Marc Lynch argues that the new media’s such as cable (specially Algeria TV channel), internet,
social media have created a new atmosphere in the MENA region that help people to challenge
the domination of government on the information 252. He continues that in the short-term that the
new media encourages mobilization by decreasing the expenses of interaction. According to him,
new informative technologies are so beneficial for the oppositions for spreading the ideas and
beliefs, creating a mutual language and contentious choices among the protestors 253.
According to data, during the Arab spring from the beginning of 2011, Facebook as the
most popular social platform in the Middle East had about 21 million users in the Arabic
countries and this number reached to 32 million by the end of this year. About 55% of this
number were between 13 to 24 254.
Social media played a crucial role by rising the urban protests, encouraging people to
dealing actively with the events and acting as a platform for people to circulate and analyze the
related news 255. However, we should not dwell on the importance of social media and we should
not assume that there was no revolution without social media in the Middle East. This theory is
flawed for combining tools and the institutional factors of uprisings. The internet was as
impactful on the occurrence of the mentioned revolutions in the Middle East as were the
cassettes and flyers in the occurrence of Islamic revolution of Iran.
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The internet did not generate a new culture and did not create a new reality from “nonentity” but
paved the path for blossoming of the pre-existing realities 256. Moreover, some of the overthrown
governments during the crisis just shut down the mentioned social networks. For instance,
Mubarak’s administration attacked the Aljazeera’s office and by closing it tried to prevent the
broadcasting. However, the impact of these technological tools in occurrence of the Arab Spring
is undeniable 257.
The power of social media like Facebook and Twitter in social transformation usually get
underestimated. However, the revolutions and critical changes in the Middle East have changed
the perception of people towards the social media 258.
The point is how to use these platforms for creating critical changes. Some argue that without
Facebook and Twitter there were no Arab uprisings or even not with this pace. They believe the
way to make a society free is to give them internet 259.
According to Philip Howard and Hussain, what triggers the uprisings and protests is not
only violence of the government or suppressive actions towards people like Bu Azizi or Khalid
Saeed, but the spread of the news of these events on social media. They continue, what is
interesting about these uprisings is that almost all of them emerged without a specific leader,
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charismatic ideologue, labor unions and religious clerics. In Tunisia, Bu Azizi’s self-immolations
triggered the protests, in Egypt the happenings in Tunisia and the other parts of the region joined
in after the broadcasting of the uprisings and violations of the government by the Algeria TV
channel and social media 260.

7.2.2 The Role of Oppositions
In the years prior to the revolution in Egypt and Tunisia, NGO’s, labor unions and
syndicates were actively involved in mobilizing rebellions and protests 261.
In Tunisia, “The Al Nahda” party, which once was shut down by Ben Ali, revived itself after the
regime change and gained 40% votes in the first parliament’s election. In addition, “congress for
the republic” and “labor and freedom democratic party” which were both active in the previous
administrations reached some achievements and jointly formed a governmental coalition.
In Egypt, various groups like “Muslim Brotherhood”, Sufi’s, new Wafd party and some
other NGO’s and unions by mobilizing the creation of a proper ground for united and organize
protests and made the power transformation in 2011 much easier and smoother. However, as it
mentioned earlier, considerable amount of press freedom was present in both these countries 262.
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In contrast, in Libya, where no trace of civil society was left, reformations became
violent. Accordingly, after Gadhafi’s overthrow, instability and internal conflicts reached the
point that split the country into territory of several groups.
Protests related to the shortage of bread in Egypt plus to the global strike of textile factory’s
employees in 2008, and other periodical big and small demonstrations all triggered the wave of
rebellions and dissatisfactions during the years prior to 2011 263.
relatedly, “Kifaya” or Egyptian movement for change 264 regarding the grievances against the
status quo and “We are all Khaled Saeed”265 had the most impacts in mobilizing protesters and
oppositions in Mubarak’s last days 266.

7.3 Determiners
7.3.1 Leader’s Performance at the Time of Crisis
One of the critical determiners in durability or collapse of a regime at the times of political
crisis would be the authoritarian leaders’ performance. Leadership is in fact, one of the main pillars
of a successful social movement.
While the three factors of dissatisfaction, sedimentation of the ideology and the passion for
creating a change are present among the protesters, the outcome would be failure without SMOs
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or a proper leadership. The success of a movement is depended on a leadership which can activate
the dissatisfaction and by using them create the change 267.
According to Max Weber, there are three types of legitimacy for a leadership: charismatic,
traditional, and rational

268

. Weber believes that most of the successful social movements or

revolutions have been formed by the charismatic power of a leader. At these times, the relationship
between people and the leader is based on emotions. Thus, people would accept all the decisions
even if they are not so reasonable 269.
Personal characteristics of the leader and his status would create social loyalty and on the other
hand, could cause popularity which would affect social loyalty. Social loyalty would increase
liability and accountability of the person and eventually would transform norms and values of the
supporters. This factor would lead to convergence of the people and production of the social capital
270

.
Handling street protests and popular demands could play a determinative role. For instance,

announcing statements like “I have heard your revolutionary message too. I do guarantee an
administration based on constitution, social justice and national will far from corruption, autarky
and oppression” or “My actions towards your demands is an irrevocable commitment” during the
critical moments just contain a message regarding the weakness of the system and possibility of
extra attacks. Ben Ali and Mubarak both did the same in their last TV announcement and asked
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the public to get united to prevent violence and destructive actions. They emphasized their honest
services of their administration and guaranteed more reforms. In addition, they promised not to
participate in the next election. What was apparent, however, was the real weakness of the system
against the uprisings; Giving privileges which they never have done before and shifting their
positions completely, had a clear message for civil society.
Relatedly, regarding the role of the leaders, at the times of crisis, both their physical and
psychological conditions are important. What was clear during the last TV speech of Ben Ali and
Mubarak was the aging effects and the weak tone in their voices. Specifically, in Egypt,
publicizing the replacement of Mubarak by his son, had telegraphed the poor physical condition
of the leader to the society earlier.
Many scholars argue that crisis sometimes could provide key opportunities for reform.
However, for systems with fundamental issues and corrupted foundations these opportunities are
so small and far from the reach. During these situations, it is possible to act quickly instead of
making announcements and refuse any types of violence or do the exact opposite thing and try to
suppress the uprisings by help of the police forces and military 271.

7.3.2 The Role of Police Forces and Military
Police and military forces are the main tool of the authoritarian regimes for obliging
people to obey and upholding their power against the opposition. Collapse of governments define
whether they remain unsuccessful in using their coercion tool for any reason or if the oppositions
mobilize a much stronger power against the government. Military and police forces were the
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most important tool in hands of the Arab dictators for confronting the opposition in recent
decades. Majority of the Arab leaders had a military background. From 1967 and most of
Mubarak’s 30 years of leadership, Egypt was running by emergency constitution law. According
to this law, many leverages were in hand of the police and military forces for suppressing the
press and restraining parties and communities. For instance, arresting without a warrant was
legalized in Tunisia. The case was similar in Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, and Yemen; Ghaddafi’s
Libya was a police state 272.
During the uprisings known as the Arab spring both police and military forces played a
crucial role confronting the oppositions or surrendering their demands. In all the involved
countries, at the beginning the government just used the police forces. Later, by increasing of the
protesters number and continuation of the uprisings, the military got involved.
The critical moment during the uprisings was when the military in Tunisia and Egypt refused to
open fire on the protesters and not only did not support security and police guards but also asked
them to not act aggressively against the protesters 273 .
The Egyptian and Tunisian military believed that they were responsible for providing
security and supporting country against the foreign threats, not an ideology, a specific party, or a
political system. Such a perception regarding the role of the military in the society, would lead to
acting based on the constitution at the times of crisis and not supporting the system. Presence of
the public in the streets with no fear also could prepare the ground for the formation. Yet, it
should be mentioned that the rate of interest of military in the governmental facilities and

272

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring military defections and
loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria." Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 337-349.
273

Ibid

123
financial resources and their perception of the international society’s spot regarding the internal
transformations could impact their performance.
In both mentioned cases, the situation had been against the ruling regime 274. This was
not the case in Libya, or Yemen. Thus, uprisings became lengthy, fierce, and bloody. In both
Egypt and Tunisia, military forces except the high rank militia officers, not only benefited from
the economic development but also were realizing that the international community’s perception
is affiliated with the regime transformation. Regarding the Tunisian and Egyptian alterations, the
international community did not block the transformations and by calling it the “Arab Spring”
informed the spring of democracy and freedom to the Arab’s world 275.
Now the main question is why Arab militaries had different reactions in different states?
It seems one of the reasons was related to the members which the military was made up of. For
instance, militaries which majority of the members believe their future and current position
would be in danger with a change in the system, will lead to more resistance. This case is related
to those militaries in which recruitment was not merit based but instead was based on the
connections to the ruling ethnic society (Bahrain), specific group or the leader himself. (for
instance, Ghaddafi’s military). Respectively, Jordan’s military which consists of tribal members
of East Jordan’s river remained loyal to the regime in the movement which most of its supporters
were Palestinians of West Jordan’s river. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s International guard which
consists of tribal members of center and West also did not hesitate in supporting the regime.
In contrast, Egypt and Tunisia which had a more professional recruitment and were not
concerned about the impact of regime change on their future, remained neutral 276. Syria’s
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military which was under the command of Alevi’s and Assad’s family and Yemen’s military the
majority of which was under the direct command of Abdullah Saleh’s close relatives, all
remained loyal to their regimes.
The aftermath of Mubarak’s overthrowal proves that Egypt’s military was not interested
in being involved in the fringe of Egypt’s political developments. This is explainable by the
position of this military in the society. Egypt’s military for reasons such as being involved in few
battles with Israel gained a high status in society and during the last decade has been
participating significantly in the economic activities of the country. (Anderson, 2011)
In contrast, Tunisia’s military played a more marginal role in the revolution of this country.
Even despite the declaration of neutrality after the overthrow of Ben Ali, he did not become one
of the main actors. This could be because Tunisia’s military did not experience any war and did
not have a specific place in the country.

7.3.3 Foreign Interventions
Foreign intervention is one of the key factors of occurrence of the Arab movements.
Foreign involvements in the regional politics (U.K till the World War I, and the U.S thereafter)
which was through the dependent governments, was the main reason of Arab’s deep
dissatisfaction of the ruling systems 277. There was a linkage between the Arab autocratic
regimes and the West. These linkages were varied from economic, political, diplomatic ties to
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cross-border flows of people, services, and information 278. The main concern of these autocrat
governments was getting the endorsement of the Western powers instead of accountability. The
point is the linkage to the West contributed to democratization by strengthening oppositions and
isolating autocrats in the long run. Linkage to the West played a significant role during the Arab
revolts between 2011 and 2013. While linkage to the external powers prohibited the collapse of
some regimes or delayed their collapse, facilitated the rapid collapse of others.
During the uprisings of Tunisia and Egypt, the Western powers after realizing the
immensity of the revolutionary movements, stopped supporting their previous allies. (Only
France tried to support Ben Ali against the protesters in Tunisia for a while). Declaring neutrality
of the West decreased the confidence of the Tunisia and Egypt leaders and eventually led to their
immediate fall 279.
Yet, in Yemen, despite the preference of the Western countries and Persian Gulf states to
Abdullah Saleh’s stay, the massive protesters and oppositions did allow any financial or even
political intervention in support of Saleh. However, after the Jordan’s chaos, the U.S and Saudi
Arabia which were the main supporters and longtime allies of Malek Abdullah, sent assistance to
help the country with their economic and financial difficulties 280.
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Saudi Arabia sent financial assistance to the Mubarak’s regime through the Persian Gulf
Cooperation Council, however, this was not enough for restraining the massive Egyptian protests
281

.
As for the Yemeni regime, this type of foreign aid reached to its highest point while

Saudi Arabia started supporting the Al Khalifa regime directly by sending military and troops.
As it mentioned, foreign intervention in the last two examples, act in support of the involved
regimes. On the other hand, foreign intervention was the main factor that prevents the dictator of
an oil-rich country, Gadhafi, for example from accessing financial and military facilities for
ending the chaos and instability. NATO’s direct intervention was the fastest factor in collapse of
the Gadhafi’s regime 282.
As for Syria, the point is, there are so many foreign countries involved in the crisis that
somehow are supporters of the regime or oppositions. Many of the Arab countries plus Turkey,
are actively trying to oust Assad while Western countries are on the same side. However, Russia,
China and Iran are inclined to maintain this regime.
There is no doubt that the main factor for tracking the events in Syria would be international
alignments and the way of reforming this alignment.
It is apparent from the above discussion that years of experience in conditions like
economic pressure, deep social inequalities, increasing youth unemployment along their
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dissatisfaction, political suppression, monopolization of power by one family or party and factors
like this had created the needed setting for formation of grievance-based social movements in
Tunisia and Egypt.
The self-immolation of an individual like Bouazizi was enough to trigger the ignored
demands and feelings of humiliation and to transform them into massive protests.
The critical question to answer in the next chapter is while all these pressures and barriers exist
in other MENA countries as well, why were Tunisia and Egypt the initiators of the Arab Spring?
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CHAPTER 8
SUGGESTED MODEL FOR EXPLAINING THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE
MENA REGION

The political crisis in the Middle East is the most complicated regional crisis in the world.
Domestic factors, regional factors and actors and outsiders all play impactful roles in the process
of this crisis. This is while recognizing the factors and impactful actors in any crisis, has the
critical role in examining the crisis and the ways to end it. But now it is time for answering the
main question of this study. While the crisis was present all over the MENA, and all of the
MENA countries are struggling with the mentioned challenges, why were Tunisia and Egypt the
initiators of the Arab Spring and why the outcome of the uprisings were not similar in all of the
involved countries? What causes the success and failure of each movement?
the suggested model and the outcomes are based on an analytical-explanatory approach by help
of case-studies and Brecher research model283.

8.1 Brecher Research Model
Michael Brecher for answering the vague meaning of crisis presents a new definition of
crisis and studied 323 international crises for this matter. Eventually, he argues that it is possible
to study a crisis both based on the “actor” and the “system” 284.
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Brecher model is a combination of the process of crisis, factors, facilitators, and determiners.
Based on the available variables for this study, ethnic minorities, inflexible political system,
massive foreign intervention are the critical factors for creating and fueling the MENA region
crisis.
Based on the Crisis Theory of Michael Brecher, each crisis would go through four stages.
Creation: (Brecher, 2013)285: at this stage, the crisis is starting to form.
Development: (Pick of the crisis): the stage of development of the crisis basically is a stage
where the crisis would reach to its maximum level which could lead to the maximum mental
pressure. At this stage, the development factor would be, the transformation of anger from the
low to higher levels. This could happen by moving from the non-important actions towards the
significant or sometimes battles among the oppositions.
Decline: This stage would happen while the opposition groups or other actors realize the
outcomes of the crisis. From the government’s point of view, the decline of the crisis has been
recognized by occurrence of the factors like elimination of the threat, time pressure and
possibility of war. This could create the mindset for the involved actors in the war, that reaching
an agreement for ending the war and crisis would be the best possible option for both sides.
Influence: (post-crisis): this stage is about the after math of the crisis and the outcomes that has
been remained from the involved actors 286.
However, what is important regarding a crisis is “the reasons, factors and the impactful
actors in occurrence and development of the crisis”. Michael Brecher by finding a connection
between the factors of the crisis and its stages, argues that the pre-existing factors and
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determiners of a crisis all make the happening of the creation, development, decline and
influence more possible. This, in fact, is possible by impacting on the understanding of the
decision makers and public opinion at the same time. According to Brecher, some of these
factors are the political parties, geopolitical location, political system, and the intervention of the
regional and international powers 287.
However, one of the weaknesses of the model is its incapability in finding a proper
relation between internal and external factors in formation of a crisis and does not create an
accurate systematic analysis for the crises that still did not reach to their last stage.
Now, it is time to apply the MENA region on the Brecher crisis model. Based on the stages of
the model, obviously MENA is at the development stage or pick of the crisis.
At this stage, some actions will occur from both sides, the powerholders, and the public.
If we imagine society as a form of hierarchical pyramid, the powerholders are on top of the
pyramid and the people power or public are at the bottom. Accordingly, the power would flow
from the top to the bottom, and the power holders are the ones who have the authority for
controlling the state, social norms, myths, institutions, and laws. Moreover, the outcome is what
is beneficial for the power holders and unfavorable for the powerless people or the whole society
288

.
While there is chaos and dissatisfaction in the country, the power holders could use some

strategies to keep existing problems out of the public’s awareness. It should take into
consideration that mostly; these strategies are applicable to non-democratic societies. Some of
these strategies which are being used regularly in MENA are as follows:
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1- Managing and controlling the accessible information to the public through the media
2- Denial of the existing problems
3- Creating fear and distress for the public by displaying a false image of the threatening
demons (Communism, the West, terrorism)
4- Creating “societal myths”, which means showing the exact opposite of what is going on in
the reality
Now in response, the public at the time of crisis would have different reactions as well.
In most cases, before any social movement or uprising begins, the public are not aware of the
violation of their rights and values by the regime. However, they would react differently if they
knew the truth.
One possible scenario is related to the time when the regime or the power holders are
trying to hide their actual doctrines and policies and the reality of what is going on from the
public. At this time the public who are not aware of what is going on and the violation of their
interests and just trust the government and support the status quo, by assuming that they cannot
change the situation and also justifying that power holders are taking care of more important
causes or issues. Thus, it could be concluded that the public either is not aware of what is going
on in the country or believes that it is not a severe problem. Yet only 10 to 15 percent of the
population are conscious and oppose the power holders’ policies.
The second scenario is related to the time of starting of failure of the institutions. The
situation is still not that bad. Moreover, power holders are still able to manage the fake news.
The opposition groups are not still that strong to change the public opinion. Also, the percentage
rise of the public awareness to 20-30% is not still enough to make a change.
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The third stage is the stage which is the outcome of the preexisting problems and
difficulties that build up over many years. At this stage, people are exhausted and unsatisfied.
They reached the point where none of their expectations have met. It is the best time for the
opposition to make them aware about the significance of the situation, their violated rights and
how they became the main victim of the system. The result would be a sharp rise in the number
of conscious and opposing people. While the power holders would continue to hide the issue by
controlling the media, social and political institutions and pretend that their policies are
unchallenged.
The last stage is when the occurrence of an event or according to Moyer (2001), a
“trigger event” would lead to take off the social movements. This event is what is a matter for all
the society. Which the combination of this trigger event with the preexisting unhappiness, anger
and dissatisfaction would lead to the uprising and protests, no matter of availability or
mobilization of resources, political opportunity, or the system suppressions. The social
movements which happen at this stage are categorized as the new social movements. However,
the success or failure of the movements which would happen at this stage are what is the main
concern of this study.
As such, now that we learned about the reasons that made Tunisia and Egypt the initiators
of the Arab uprisings, by describing the suggested model, and applying it on the two mentioned
cases, I am going to compare and contrast the outcomes, possibilities, differences and
similarities.

Figure 2. Suggested Model for Describing the Formation of MENA Movements
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There are various impactful factors on each of the four main present challenges of
Secularism-Islamism, economic gap, ethnic and tribal division, and the administrative gap. As
for the Secularism-Islamism gap the impactful factors are role of Islam and ideology. As we
mentioned the old and humiliating ideologies have started to fade due to the paradigm shift and
people now have more tendency towards secular democratic ideas which promote freedom of
rights and human dignity. The next factor which is technology and social media was so impactful
in this awareness and distinction of Secularism and Islamism. The last impactful factor in this
distinction is the ultimate demand of democracy and freedom of rights. People have realized that
it is not possible to search for this demand in Islamism, since it has no improvement or revision
since the ancient times. As such, matching the new mindsets, demands and attitudes is not
possible with the old Islamic ideologies.
As for the next gap which is the economic gap, the impactful factors are the rentier states,
dual economy, and the clash between expectations and reality. As it mentioned before, the
revenue from the rent of the natural resources just circulates among the government instead of
spreading among the people. This could cause a negative effect for the totalitarian countries that
instead of having economic growth they would face an economic crisis. The reason is not
spending the revenue for the development and growth of the country but for practicing
intervention and control on all the economic and social activities of the society and using
suppression as needed. corruption is one of the main characteristics of the rentier states,
However, as the result of education and social media people’s awareness has been increased
about the system’s massive corruption, increased poverty and social inequality in the society
despite the economic growth that countries like Tunisia and Egypt had faced prior to the Arab
Spring. This led to more increment of unhappiness and dissatisfaction among the people that
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they must struggle with basic needs in these rich countries, with revenue from natural resources.
The dual economy is one of the characteristics of the underdeveloped economy.
This feature which exists in the Middle East is also another outcome of the rentier states.
As a matter of this fact there are two sectors present in economy. The modern advanced and the
traditional one. This division is related to the formation of private organizations which are all
dependent to the government and work with the rent revenue. The officials of all these
companies are somehow related to the system. Thus, the revenue of all these organizations just
circulate among themselves instead of being beneficial to economic growth. This distinction
would create a dual culture which is related to division of society into two groups of rich and
poor. It is possible to argue that this distinction between the civilians is the reason behind their
dissatisfaction and unhappiness and as polls show although prior to the Arab Spring there were
economic development in Tunisia and Egypt , but the level of relative deprivation and
dissatisfaction among the youth have been increased between 2009-2010 years and thus, the
level of their happiness has been decreased Relatedly, during the years prior to the revolution,
there was no increase in national income in these countries by means of better splits of the
incomes as a result of increased poverty level due to the massive corruption and social inequality
in the society
The next challenge which is ethnic and tribal division was impacted by the minority
groups which are usually religious minorities or members of a specific tribe or ethnic. They have
their own demands, and they would cause social challenges in society for sectarian reasons. On
the other hand, civil society is not strong enough and capable of any maneuver in Middle Eastern
countries. Although a strong civil society would be able to eliminate the dissatisfactions and
decrease the distinction between the tribes and ethnic groups by encouraging them to get united
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society. Same as a strong civil society, powerful labor union and NGOs also could have a
positive impact on ethnic and tribal division. Instead of the presence of various dissatisfied
minority groups in the Middle Eastern countries, the presence of labor unions and NGOs could
be helpful in mobilizing people, making them united and eventually creating a proper ground for
united and organized protests.
The last challenge is the administrative challenge. This challenge would emerge based on
the leader’s influence. If the leader only relies on the military for suppressing people by giving
them privileges, the civil society will increase their distance from the military. Additionally, in
the Middle East there are still monarchical systems. The political system of most of these
regimes are under the influence of monarchies with tribal and religious tendencies and their
leaders use these tendencies as the logic of politics and government for upholding the status quo.
These lengthy administrations and monarchies and their policies for ruling all lead to separation
of the civil society from the military which is the main pillar of the government in the Middle
Eastern countries. Because according to evidence, mostly, in lengthy administrations, the
military is and will remain loyal to the system under any conditions. The last impactful factor is
the foreign aid. People are aware of the wealth and natural resources of their countries, but at the
same time there are unemployment, poverty, and economic crisis in the country. Yet, the system
is still dependent on the foreign aid and instead must obey. This leads to dissatisfaction which
the answer is force and suppression by the military. Thus, we can say foreign aids also would be
impactful on the distinction between civil society and the military.
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Table 5. The Impactful Factors on the Outcome of the Social Movements

Possible
Foreign intervention
scenarios

Military forces
loyalty

Head of the
system’s
performance

Outcome

1a

û

ü

ü

Maintain

1b

ü

ü

ü

Maintain

1c

ü

ü

û

Maintain

2

ü

û

ü

Maintain

3a

û

û

û

Change

3b

û

û

ü

Change

3c

ü

û

û

Change

4

û

ü

û

Semi-change

Note: ü represents presence and û represents absence
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Based on the existing data when an uprising or social movement happen in a nondemocracy which is at the trigger event stage there are three main determiners which could
predict the outcome of the success or failure of the movement289.
Based on the suggested model, there are three impactful determiners at the time of crisis
in an involved country. Accordingly, presence or absence of any of these factors could lead to
the main outcomes of change or maintenance of the status quo. Now, I am going to explain each
scenario with an example and later apply the above model on the three main case studies of this
research.

8.2 Possible Scenarios
First it should be mentioned that all the mentioned variables for causing the crisis and
public’s dissatisfaction are present. A majority of people are aware and conscious about the
situation and they demand change. Oppositions are active. People are trying to take the
advantage of social media for more awareness despite the censorship. There is the possibility that
the trigger event has happened.
Now, I am going to describe the determiners which are all sub-factors under the category
of administrative challenge. I argue that these factors could create the various outcomes at the
time of crisis for social movements of MENA. As it mentioned before, foreign intervention could
play an important role at the time of crisis. Also, it was one of the main factors that led to
occurrence of the Arab Spring. The linkages between the Arab countries and the West always
exist. Put differently, the Arab autocrat leaders were always somehow dependent on the West
and needed their endorsement instead of accountability. However, while there is a possibility that
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linkage to the West prevents the collapse of a country at the time of crisis, the opposite is also
possible. It all depends on the benefit and advantage the change or maintenance that the country
which is struggling could have for the foreign countries. Accordingly, despite the linkage to the
West, in some of the below scenarios there is no sign of foreign intervention at the time of crisis.
The next factor in this scenario is the relationship between the military and police forces
and the public. In some of the MENA countries, the regime is being ruled by the previous
military officer who has become a civilian politician over time. In this type of regime, the
military has the veto right and occasionally acts through the unofficial channels behind the
scenes. Egypt, Algeria, and Syria are examples.
Monarchies which are reliant on the tribes, as mentioned before, are more in oil-rich
countries around the Persian Gulf, Morocco, and Jordan. In these systems, maintenance of the
status quo depends on the previous recruitment from the tribes or the linkage to the foreign
countries. As for Bahrain, Oman and Qatar, the dependence on the foreign countries is
impressive. Bigger monarchies like the Saudi Arabia and Morocco use the loyal tribal forces for
balancing and controlling the military. In regimes with dual militaries, military forces are acting
based on an ideology instead of tribal loyalties. Examples are Iraq during Saddam Hussein and
Libya during Qaddafi’s administration 290.
While according to the evidence, throughout history, many of the Arab leaders had the
support and loyalty of the military, there are some exceptions. In general, we can argue that
during each of the Arab uprising and movements, the military played a critical role.
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The last impactful factor is the leadership. The performance of the leader at the time of crisis
could easily change the path of the scenario. Playing an honest role at this time and listening to
the people’s demands by creating some immediate changes could be helpful. Age and the health
condition of the leader, weak or strong tones, expectation levels of the public demands all could
affect the outcomes.

8.2.1 Scenario 1a
In this defined scenario, according to the records and outcomes of the Arab Spring when
there is no linkage to the West or Western countries do not see any benefits in intervention, the
military is loyal to the system and is against the public by using force and violence, and the
leader displays the best of himself in managing the crisis, the outcome is equal to maintaining of
the status quo.
Example: Algeria
The wave of Arab uprisings did not affect Algeria in the way it had its eastern neighbors.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika was able to control the uprisings and disputes in 2011. He perfectly took
advantage of the people’s fear of getting back to the bloody old domestic wars of the 90s by
announcing a set of reforms and at the same time establishing his authority. Moreover, he was
chosen for the fourth time as the president in 2014. After controlling two different waves of
uprisings on January and February in 2011, he guaranteed political reforms which would be able
to deepen the democratic process and also give the chance to citizens to prioritize the choices that
are related to their future much easier 291.
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The truth is, in contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, the main power in Algeria is in the military’s
hands. The capability of the police forces and the gendarmerie were reinforced dramatically since
the civil conflict in 1990s and the number of police forces were about 200,000 by the end of 2000s.
Moreover, the president cannot act against the generals. The problem is that military’s influence
is not limited to the government, but it is dominant on country’s economy too. However, during
the 2011 uprisings the police force did not act brutally, but their presence was enough for the riots
to spread without acting aggressively.
Because of the active presence of military and police forces in Algeria’s uprisings during
the Arab Spring, the disputes were not fruitful the same as Egypt and Tunisia.
Finally, at the time of crisis there was no sign of foreign intervention or financial support in
Algeria. Thus, the outcome was maintaining of the status quo by Bouteflika’s leadership with some
practical reformations as people demand 292.

8.2.2 Scenario 1b
In this scenario all the studied factors are present. There is a linkage between the involved
country and the West. So, the possibility of the foreign intervention is available. The Military is
loyal to the regime and is against the public by operating based on the situation. Leader is also
acting properly in handling the crisis. The outcome of this situation is maintaining the status quo.
Example: Bahrain
Bahrain is among the countries which faced the crisis. The uprisings in this country
began on Feb 14th, 2011. Most of the population are Shia and the minority are Sunni. The 70%
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Shia population of this country has no presence in any of the monarchy organization, any
managerial positions, or macro businesses. When people decided to demonstrate to demand their
rights, they faced with a massive suppression by the military guards.
In Bahrain, mercenary forces are being used for controlling the military. Since the Sunni
regime of Bahrain believes it is vulnerable against the Shia, they found no other way other than
using foreigners (specially Pakistanis) for forming a powerful and suppressor military against the
Shia opposers 293. The Al Khalifa regime distributed the critical and military positions among the
group of loyal officers to the royal family. Thus, the military stands by the regime and shut down
the riots.
Other than suppressing the protestors in the streets by Bahrain’s government forces,
Saudi forces were also present there. Saudi Arabia sent military forces to Bahrain for shutting
down the uprisings, by following three main goals: First, maintaining the stability of the region
and preventing the entrance of chaos and disorder into Saudi Arabia; Second, to be able to play a
more active role in the region by keeping the connection with the West; and third, preventing the
possible influence of Iran on the majority of Bahraini Shias 294.
Military intervention of the Saudi Arabia in Bahrain is one of the important reasons that
has prevented the occurrence of a revolution in Bahrain. On March 14, 2011, 2000 soldiers
containing 1200 Saudi soldiers which were supporting by tanks, and 800 Emirati soldiers,
entered Bahrain by official invitation of Al Khalifa’s administration 295.
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In Bahrain, the full support of the regime by military and security forces, prevented the
demonstrators to achieve both the structural reformations and political-structural alterations. As
such, violent repression of the opposers by the Al Khalifa and Al Saud’s military forces, caused
continuity of frozen politics.
By reviewing scenario 1a and 1b we can conclude that when the variables of leaders’
performance and military loyalty to the system are present, the presence or absence of foreign
intervention does not result in the system change.

8.2.3 Scenario 1c
During this scenario there is a connection between the country involved in the crisis and
foreign countries. Thus, there is the possibility of foreign intervention as needed. Moreover, the
military and police force are against the public and loyal to the regime. On top of that, the
performance of the leader is not satisfactory. As such, the outcome of this scenario would be the
continuance of the status quo.
Example: Yemen
Yemen also got involved with new transitions by the beginning of the MENA’s uprisings.
People of this country challenged the Abdullah Saleh administration by emerging a people’s
movement 296.
Majority of the social forces that stand against the Saleh’s regime in 2011 are as follows:
the students and youths’ movement, Houthis, Southern people, Al Ahmar impactful family and
groups of the military officers which got separated from the Saleh’s regime. Thus, in Yemen,
that part of the military which had tribal dependence got separated from Saleh and that caused
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armed conflicts. The full control and authority of the military was in the hands of Saleh’s
children and relatives for their guaranteed loyalty.
During the uprisings, at the beginning Saudi Arabia started to support Saleh and
demanded he maintain of power. Later, by expansion of the protests and the possibility of its
entrance to Saudi Arabia, Saudis planned for ousting Saleh peacefully 297.
With the decision of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, and the U.S support, Mansur
Hadi was replaced with Saleh. However, this did not lead to the end of difference among the
various movements. The incapability of Hadi’s administration in splitting the power among the
oppositions, impacted the Yemen Shia’s dissatisfactions. The coincidence of this happening with
reinforcement of the Al-Qaida’s forces in south Yemen, led to more chaos and instability in
Yemen. Continues protest of Ansarullah298 forces against the regime corruption, dependence of
the regime to the West and the United States, economic policies of the government, all caused
the progress of the Shia’s forces to the point that the government and oppositions signed a peace
and partnership agreement. According to this agreement, the president was responsible for
creating the essential foundation for forming the government of national unity by Houthi’s
participation. However, after a while, oppositions began their contentious by calling the
government’s action fake and insufficient. The protests became more serious in 2014 and
eventually led to taking control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa and surrounding of the presidential
house. The power and influence of the Houthi’s made the northern neighbors worry. Thus, Saudi
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Arabia began their air invasion in March 2015 against the Ansarullah by supporting Hadi’s
regime. (Nejat et al., 2016)299
Thus, replacing Saleh with Hadi not only helped the crisis in Yemen but also amplified it.
As such, by the contentiousness of the Houthis to Hadi and reaching the domain of the protests to
the capital, he had no other way than leaving the country and escaping to Saudi Arabia. (Hasan,
2011)300
To conclude, through these transformations, Hadi’s administration was able to infiltrate
to some areas and establish a government in Odon 301. In general, the role of the military in the
process of uprisings was against the people and it saved its loyalty to the regime somehow.
By comparing scenario 1b and 1c we can conclude that, when the factors of foreign
intervention and military loyalty to the system are present, the leader’s performance does not
matter, and the outcome would be maintaining of the status quo.

8.2.4 Scenario 2
In the third scenario, the linkage between the involved country and the West exists. So,
there is the possibility of the foreign intervention if they believe it is necessary. The performance
of the leader is acceptable during the crisis. However, military and police forces instead of
remaining loyal to the regime, stand next to the public. This factor by itself is enough for
creating the change.
Example: Jordan
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Right after the beginning of the uprisings in Tunisia, Jordanian people started protesting
by gathering in the Amman’s streets, demanding political change. However, the uprisings in
Jordan were not comparable to the mass protests in Tunisia or Egypt.
In the case of Jordan, the demand for uprisings was mainly a change of government and not a
revolution. Thus, the king sacrificed governments such as Marouf al-Bakhit 302and Samir alRifai303 one after the other and by throwing early parliament elections and revising the
constitution, starting a direct interaction with the political parties, prevented any contentious
towards the head of power and the kingdom. Later, he just limited the dissatisfaction to the
government and eventually stopped it 304.
The essence of uprisings in Jordan was not aggressive from the beginning. This was
dependent on a couple of reasons. First, the government was so cautious in using force against
the protesters. At the same time, protesters were hopeful to be able to get along with the king for
creating some crucial changes. They believed that violence only would hurt their position for
negotiation and would ruin any possible opportunity for reformation 305.
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According to the reports of the Center for Strategic Studies of Jordan University (CSS),
80% of people were against the street protests and 55% of them believed that the protests would
lead to chaos and could weaken of the stability and security 306.
The Jordanian officials followed the carrot and stick strategy through the uprisings. By giving
the protesters enough freedom to express their anger and dissatisfaction, at the same time they
tried to control the protesters by using of force for creating specific red lines, especially
regarding the criticism of monarchy 307.
Regarding the foreign policy of Jordan and the foreign intervention during the chaos it
should be mentioned that Jordan is the second Arabic-Islamic country that recognizes Israel, and
two countries share a land border. Interaction of this country with the U.S representatives proves
their intention in controlling the situation in Jordan. Moreover, the Second Abdullah, asked the
international figures and leaders of neighboring countries for helping him out of the chaos. By
following their suggestions along the Western analysts’ tips, he decided to make some calm
reforms after controlling the public anger and dissatisfaction. In this way, he believed he could
prevent the weakening of his administration pillars and at the same time provide the benefits of
his Western supporters 308.
Another thing that helped the Jordanian officials to confront the protests was the financial
aid of the other countries. For instance, Saudi Arabia, gave 400 million dollars in financial aid to
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Jordan in 2011. The Gulf Cooperation Council guaranteed to help Jordan more than 2 billion
dollars in the next five years and asked Jordan to join this council 309.
The United States also other than military assistance gave about 682,700-million-dollar financial
aid.
To conclude, the United states and Saudi Arabia despite the different orientation against
the Jordan, do not attempt to lose a stable and valuable ally in the MENA region. (Bassam et al.,
2004)310

8.2.5 Scenario 3a
This scenario is completely the opposite of the previous one. There is no foreign
intervention at the time of crisis. the linkage between the involved country and the West might
exist or not. At the same time, Military is beside the public instead of being loyal to the system.
Moreover, the leader’s performance is not acceptable. There are signs of weakness and accepting
failure. Thus, the outcome would be a change of the status quo.
Example: Tunisia
As I mentioned earlier, the revolutions and uprisings of the Arab world, began with the
Tunisia’s protests. When a youth, Muhammed Bouazizi in a small city, Sidi Bouzid, burned
himself in public, in objection to confiscation of all his belongings and only source of income, it
was a spark which set the dictatorship of Bin Ali on fire. From that day, protests began from this
small suburb, and reached to other cities and the capital. The reaction of the government to the
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wave of protests, emerged in two ways. Bin Ali’s administration at the beginning used security
forces for repressing the protestors as always. Although the protests not only did not stop, they
got expanded with increased strength. Eventually, Bin Ali, asked the military to come to the
streets for protecting the federal organizations and institutions or in fact helping in suppressing
people. This action had a great impact on the success of the revolution. The reason was that the
military not only suppressed people but also on many occasions played like a guard between the
protestors and security guards and prevented the suppression of the citizens by them. When Bin
Ali realized that he was not successful in managing the chaos, he insisted on meeting the military
commander. He asked the commander to either suppress the protests or resign which he refused.
Later, General Rashid Ammar, the commander of Tunisia’s military joined the revolutionaries
and asked Bin Ali to withdraw 311.
At this point, thousands of police forces joined the protesters in the uprisings against the
regime to show their sympathy. (Daily Mail, January 24th, 2011)
It was the exact next day that general Rashid Ammar officially announced that he joined the
revolutionaries and will support the revolution. (Al-Jazeera, 2011)
For some reasons, the Tunisian military was not interested in defending Bin Ali’s power.
Moreover, family corruption of the regime disappointed the military. Bin Ali played down the
military to prevent the military’s intervention in political issues. The Tunisian military became
weak and it was less than 30,000 forces. This little number was the reason that the military was
weaker than other organizations and instead of being impactful was more under control. This
was one main reason that the military was not behind Bin Ali. In general, the military was not
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involved in the domestic issues. Thus, remainder of Bin Ali at power was equal to remainder of
the military in the shadows. As such, the military by supporting the revolutionaries was hopeful
to achieve a better position at the new administration 312.
Put differently, the military sacrificed Bin Ali, for controlling the chaos and preventing
the complete collapse of the regime. Moreover, since the military was doubtful about the
possible substitutes after the collapse of the regime, it got involved and called itself a supporter
of the revolution to prevent the radical’s surfing by two strategies. First, the military gained
much credit and popularity by standing beside the protesters and secondly, stood beside the
public and supported the revolution by sacrificing Bin Ali.

8.2.6 Scenario 3b
During this scenario, the leader’s performance is acceptable. However, the leader alone
will not be able to handle the crisis without having any support. Since there is no foreign
intervention and the military is not loyal to the leader, no matter the power of the leader, the
outcome would be change of the status.
Example: N/A
By reviewing the scenarios 3a and 3b we can conclude that when the variables of foreign
intervention and military loyalty to the system are absent, the leader’s performance does not
matter, and the outcome would be change of the status.
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8.2.7 Scenario 3c
In the scenario 3c, there is a linkage to the West or in other words the foreign countries
see the outgoing situation beneficial for intervention. It could be because of the natural resources
or the sensitive geopolitical position of the involved country. However, the military and police
forces stay beside the people by supporting them instead of suppressing them or foreign
countries would not let the military to support the leader. Accordingly, the leader appears so
weak and scared through the speeches, and the military is not loyal to the system, thus there is no
other way than withdrawing and leaving the country. The outcome of this scenario would be a
change of the status quo.
With that being said, by comparing scenario 3a and 3c, we can conclude that when the
leaders performance is not acceptable, and the military is not loyal to the leader, no matter of
presence or absence of foreign intervention, the outcome would be change of the status quo.
Example: Islamic Revolution of Iran 1979
Iran during the Reza Shah dynasty was dependent to the West. At the time of uprisings,
there was foreign intervention against the Shah. Also, according to the recent reports, the United
States which was involved in the regime change did not let the military to support the Shah.
Military stayed besides the people. Shah who was sick and weak, left the country. By presence of
foreign intervention, weak leadership, and disloyalty of the military to the regime, the outcome
was the regime change or change of status quo.
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8.2.8 Scenario 4
In this case, there is no foreign intervention. The military and police forces are still loyal
to the system and doing their jobs. However, the performance of the leader is weak. It is possible
that he leaves the country prior to the uprisings. At this time, based on the military’s strength in
handling the situation, it is possible for them to take control and suppress the uprisings. But it is
also possible that they try to settle down the public by listening to their demands and take the
control of the administration until transferring it to the next leader. So, we can argue that the
outcome in this scenario would be semi-change. Because even if the military takes the control,
the status quo will not remain the same. The outcome would be reaching the demands partially
and not completely. So, I defined the outcome of this scenario is semi-change.
Example: Egypt
Hosni Mubarak after 30 years of leadership, through the 18 days of political protests and
riots, withdrew from power on Feb 11th, 2011 and handed over the power to the armed forces.
Egypt’s military which was one of the biggest militaries in the Middle East and had a specific
status because of its achievements in the battle with Israel and the great security performance in
defending the boarders and the Suez Canal313 314.
The Egyptian military had a close relationship with the society. Military was able to fully
control the lack of security in the streets during the beginning of the riots. However, when the
anti-riot forces opened fire on the protesters at the Tahrir square of Cairo, they stayed neutral.
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Moreover, eventually the military decided to withdraw from Mubarak’s regime and maintain the
system. With the fall of Hosni Mubarak and formation of the military transfer council, they
followed three goals. Guaranteeing remaining of the positive image of the military in the society,
protecting the country from the regional and international wars, and creating economic
conditions. As such, during the transformation, the military tried to keep the crowd out of the
streets to following its goals by creating peace and stability in the country 315.
After officially announcing its neutrality, the Egyptian military tried to protect the public
and historical places. Moreover, they announced clearly that they are not going to shoot the
protesters. The defense minister also declared that the military would respect civilian’s demands,
is aware of its responsibility in protecting the revolutionary act of the nation and will support the
freedom of speech and the peaceful negotiation of any of the citizens 316.
Mubarak’s performance was not acceptable during the crisis and the military was able to easily
convince him to withdraw. The military took the power which lasted until the transferring of the
executive power to the elected people’s government.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND THE FUTURE STUDIES
As we mentioned earlier, the timeline between 2010 and 2014 was an important timeline
in the history of the MENA region. Many uprisings and social movements happened in different
Middle Eastern countries demanding transformation of the political system. Although, some of
the movements failed and some were successful in reaching their political demands or creating
change in the political system. But the important point is that the social situation of the involved
countries in the Arab Spring have been changed since the occurrence of these movements.
One reason could be related to the occurrence of these uprisings after a long period of time.
Since the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, there has been no noteworthy if any massive
protest or uprising in the MENA region.
Although there was pre-existing dissatisfaction among the people, there was not a proper
political space to express the dissatisfaction and amid the fear and closed political system, even
visualization of any dramatic political and social transformation was far-reaching for the people.
Moreover, what is clear is that the nature of these uprisings and movements was make them
different with the 20th century movements like Marxism, nationalism, or movements with
religious roots 317.
Later, this study tries to answer two main questions. Other than answering why and how
these movements emerged in the MENA region, the important question which is among all the
analysts and sociologists is whether these movements were able to achieve their desired
demands?

317
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Moreover, the goal of this study was examining the factors which would help a movement to be
successful in the MENA region. Although, it should be mentioned that what we measured in this
study is not a 100% success or failure.
What we realized through this study is that there is a large amount of literature related to
the questions about “how” and “why” social movements emerge in the first place. However, the
problem was that many of the studies were related to the political outcomes of the social
movements. What makes it problematic was the difficulty in examining whether the political
outcome was the result of specific social movements or other factors within a particular time
frame or context have been involved too. On top of that, would the political outcome in one state
with a specific political system be like the political outcome in another state with a closed
political system?
There were various definitions for the social movement in the literature. Some scholars
define social movements as the actions that groups or people of a society who are involved in a
social or political conflict take by expressing their critical oppositions, in order to reverse the
direction of conflict with what it is or what is in contrast with the historical process. (Touraine,
1981).318
In order to answer the above questions and as for my own contributions, this research
started by reviewing the main theories of social movements, both the traditional theories such as
the resource mobilization theory (RMT), the political process theory (PPT), the collective
behavior theory and the framing theory along with the new social movement theory. By
comparing these two different categories, I learned that while the main goal of the classic social
movements is expressing their demands by getting along with the status quo, the new social
318
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movements attempt is challenging the status quo. Additionally, the main struggle of the classic
movements is associated with the class conflicts regarding the allocation and production while
the new social movements have critical issues with the norms and values. Participation and
membership in the new social movements is more relaxed and informal in contrast to the classic
ones. While the classic ones are more static, intensive, and hierarchical, the new ones are more
flexible, unofficial, and participatory. Finally, the main strategy of the classic social movements
is reaching the desired demands by cooperating with the government while the new social
movements try to impact the public mind by making them follow non-political strategies.
Later, we reviewed the characteristics of a conductive political environment with the
essential resources and required preconditions for the occurrence of the social movements which
are participants, SMOs, established the structure of solidary incentive, networks and leaders.
Eventually, by applying the mainstream theories of social movements (RMT, PPT and
NSMs) to the case of MENA this research realizes that all these theories emerged in democratic
countries with constitutionally open political environments and advanced western societies.
The resource mobilization theory is well-known as one of the mainstream social
movement theories which is an attempt to study the collective actions in western societies.
Moreover, this theory tries to examine the reaction of the actors in the presence of political
opportunities. Although the outcome and the level of change the opposition groups would be
able to create is related to the resources available to them besides the ways that they employed
those resources. What is clear is that the requirements and preconditions which are needed for an
explainable social movement with this theory are not available in the closed political system of
the Middle Eastern countries. Even if opposition groups would be able to create proper
opportunities, the government would restrict any act of mobilization with an attempt to create
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social and political adjustments. Thus, the characteristics of the recent social movements in the
MENA region are somehow unique and we could describe them as more short-lived contentions
with no ideology, structure, and official leadership.
As for the political process theory in contrast to the resource mobilization theory, the
focus is more on the political opportunities instead of the available or essential resources.
According to the PPT theorists’ political opportunities are preexisting and the actors should only
wait for the right time to follow them. However, this is not the case in the closed political
systems. These types of opportunities are rarely available in non-democratic countries and if they
are, the government blocks the way to reach them to prevent any challenge towards the status
quo. Additionally, the penalty to those opposition groups or individuals who pass the narrow
limits would be detention, long term jails, prohibition of work or even execution. The
contemporary movements which happened in MENA all emerged as momentary movements,
with no specific ideology, organization, or proper leadership. All these characteristics are in
sharp contrast with the movements in the west that occur through the available political
opportunity with specific demand and leadership.
The application of the new social movement theory which generated in the west as the
development of a specific phase of western liberal societies, on MENA is highly challenging.
This theory along with its different models are mostly related to the issues and demands of the
advanced, capitalist, postindustrial societies. Middle Eastern societies where still struggling for
democracy are far away from these types of societies with a stable democracy. To conclude, the
foundation of the theories of social movements is based on the experiences and happenings in the
American and European societies which are not like the Middle East. Therefore, we need another
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theory for explaining the occurrence of the social movements in MENA, their nature and the
reason behind the failure or success of the movements.
This research contributes to the social movements’ literature first by explaining the nature
of social movement of MENA and also by explaining the historical context of the MENA region
it examines the obstacles to democracy which is the main reason that makes the nature of Middle
Eastern movements different from the rest of the world.
As we realized during the previous chapters, both classic and new social movement
theories fall short for explaining the contemporary social movements in MENA. based on the
findings/ first contribution of this research there are multiple reasons involved for incapability of
these theories and the need for a reconsideration.
First, the nature of the nature of the contemporary social movements in the MENA region
has been totally revised. However, there are little theoretical contributions, to my knowledge,
related to the social movements in non-democratic and non-western countries. And even the
assumptions of the little available literature have never been revised.
The fact is the nature of the contemporary social movements in the MENA is far from the
nature of the previous social movements in this region which the most important one was the
Islamic revolution of Iran. However, the context and pattern of the region itself is still the same
and far from Utopian and democratization. Put differently, there is a duality between the system
and its ideologies and the citizen’s requests and demands.
According to the findings of this research, the reasons behind the transformation of the
nature of the social movements in MENA are respectively, demographic change, education,
political awareness of people, creation of a new sociological context as a matter of education and
awareness, the paradigm shift, the new technologies and social media.
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All these mentioned factors confirm the necessity of the theoretical revision related to the
Middle Eastern social movements and moving beyond the general narratives and historical
models for studying movements in the politically closed systems or non-democracies.
The second contribution of this study is explaining the features that make the context and
nature of the Middle East itself unique and different. As it mentioned before, the presence of
democracy is the necessary precondition for formation of social movements. However, all these
temporary social movements occurred in the Middle East while democracy is not present there.
This research examines the obstacle to democracy in this region that due to their presence they
are not capable of completely blocking the emergence of social movements in this region. The
social movements might occur despite the obstacles; however, they might not be fruitful for a
couple of reasons, which this research will elaborate later as another contribution.
The MENA region is far from utopia and democratization for factors such as the
traditional structure, the weakness of the civil society and culture, lack of political, social and
economic development, the compatibility or incompatibility between religion and democracy,
structure of nondemocratic Middle Eastern systems and rentier states.
What is clear is the demand for democracy, freedom, social and economic development
in the Middle East is increasing. Moreover, due to modernization and globalization controlling
the public awareness is not that easy for authoritarian regimes. Although they are under lots of
pressure for preventing any chaos, at the same time they try to uphold the status quo in any
possible way.
In order to have a broader idea about the best possible way to explain the contemporary
social movements of the Middle East and the reason behind their emergence along the analysis

160
of their failure or success this research does a meta-analysis of most of the available previous
studies.
Moreover, by taking a theoretical position towards the previous studies, this research tries
to not only gather all the previously studied variables related to the Middle East but also add
more variables along a comprehensive model in order to unfold the required perquisites for the
emergence of a fruitful social movement in the MENA region.
The mentioned variables in the previous studies were divided into two categories of
institutional factors and facilitators. After reviewing all the studied variables along with the 4
major present challenges in the Middle East which are secularism-Islamism, economic gap, tribal
and ethnic division and the gap between the administrative gap, I defined 3 categories of
variables. Institutional factors which contain clash between the expectation and reality, public’s
distrust in government, sedimentation of the present ideology and social, political, and economic
instability. The second group is made up of facilitators that contain the role of labor unions and
NGOs and the role of culture and social media. The last group is of determiners that are the
leader’s performance at the time of crisis, police forces and military position and the foreign
intervention. Later, by combining the four major present challenges in the Middle East, the
related variables that are the outcomes of each gap and by help of three different cases of
Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain, I defined a chart.
According to this chart, the secularism-Islamism gap would be impacted by the role of
Islam and ideology, internet and social media and democracy/freedom of belief and thought. The
next gap which is the economic gap would be impacted by the gap which exists between
expectations and reality in society, the dual economy, and the feature of the rentier state. The
ethnic and tribal division would be impacted by the sectarianism, weakness within the civil
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society and the presence of labor unions or opposition groups. Finally, the administrative gap
would be impacted by the leader’s performance specially at the time of crisis, the position of
military and the foreign intervention.
By studying the correlation between all these variables through the Brecher crisis model,
I realized that not all the Middle Eastern countries are at the same stage of crisis. As such, that is
why one country was the initiator of the uprisings or the uprisings outcomes were different in the
various countries which were involved in the Arab uprisings.
As for the findings of my study, I learned that there are three main determiners which are
able to predict the outcome of a movement in the Middle East; Foreign intervention, military and
police force against the civil society, head of the system’s performance at the time of crisis. Yet,
two other preconditions are required; The country should be a non-democratic country and it
should be at the trigger event stage. Based on these three determiners I defined my model for
prediction of the outcome of social movements in the MENA region.
According to my model, as I mentioned the most impactful determiners for the success or
failure of movements in the Middle East region are leader’s performance at the time of crisis, the
military and police forces position (beside the civilians or against them) and the foreign
intervention. Based on this model, there are 8 possible scenarios. In the scenario 1a the foreign
intervention is absent; the military is loyal to the regime and is against the people and the
performance of the leader is powerful and proper. Thus, the outcome would be the remaining
status quo and the example is Algeria.
The scenario 1b is a scenario in which all the three variables are available. There is
foreign intervention in support of the system, the military is loyal to the system and the
performance of the leader is acceptable in handling the crisis. There is no doubt the outcome is
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success of the system in upholding the status quo and failure of the social movement. The
example for this scenario is Bahrain.
The scenario 1c is a scenario in which the foreign intervention exists, the military is loyal
to the regime, the leader’s performance is not powerful. The outcome would be remaining of the
status quo. The example of this scenario is Yemen.
In the scenario 2, foreign intervention is present in support of the system, the military and
police forces are beside the civilians. However, the performance of the leader of the country is
powerful and proper in handling the crisis. Therefore, the outcome would be remaining of the
status quo and failure of the social movement. The example for this scenario is Jordan.
In the scenario 3a, all the variables are absent. There is no foreign intervention, the
military is not loyal to the regime and the performance of the leader in handling the chaos is not
proper. Thus, the outcome would be the success of the social movement. Tunisia is the example
for this scenario.
In the scenario 3b, there is no foreign intervention, the military is beside the people and
the performance of the country’s leader is proper. The outcome though is change of the status
quo and success of the social movement. There is no example available for this scenario.
In the scenario 3c, there is foreign intervention against the regime, the military stands
beside the people instead of suppressing them and the performance of the head of the system is
weak and not acceptable at the time of crisis. As such, the outcome would be change of the status
quo and success of the social movement. Example would be Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979.
The outcome of the scenario 4 is a little bit different. There is no foreign intervention, the
military is against the people and loyal to the regime. However, the leader is not successful
enough in handling the situation. The outcome is not the complete success or failure of either
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side. There is a possibility that the military will take control of the country for a while and later
either respond to civilian’s demands positively or negatively. Therefore, I defined the outcome of
this scenario semi-change. The example for this case is Egypt.
To conclude, I defined this model based on the available cases and evidence in the
MENA region during the contemporary uprisings. I believe that the three mentioned variables
are critical in determining the outcome of social movements in this region. although, I should
emphasize on this point again that the defined success or failure is not 100% and could be
different in each scenario since the demand of each movement is different. While in one social
movement the demand is regime change, in another case it could be just economic and social
stability or other demands.

9.1 Limitations
To complete this study, I faced some limitations that should be mentioned. In general,
studying politics of the Middle East is not an easy task. From my own experience, I realized
there are some major drawbacks to study politics of the Middle East.
The first and main limitation for studying the Middle East is that literature related to the
politics of the Middle East is not rich. Due to the lack of transparency, accessing accurate and
essential data is not easy. Moreover, regarding the contemporary social movements in the
MENA region and the Arab uprisings, which are all recent happenings or somehow on going, the
field is properly new and mostly does not agree on the importance of some factors. Thus, for
solving this problem, the best alternative is using international databases, since the domestic data
if they are available, are either limited or false.
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The second problem is the dichotomy of the perspective and ideas between the Middle
Eastern scholars who live inside the Middle East and the Middle Eastern scholars who are
outside the Middle East and as such have more freedom in writing their ideas and opinions. The
process of which literature to choose and what pieces are more applicable to this study was so
hard for these reasons. To overcome this problem and in order to have a more accurate and
broader idea about my research, I tried to study a handful of literature which contains various
categories of scholars; American, European, Middle Eastern inside and outside the Middle East
along with the non-English resources. However, since all the mainstream theories of social
movements deal with Western circumstances and are based on the west-centric point of view, it
was crucial to be careful if the theory could be adopted to the conditions presented by each state
in this research.
Moreover, the fact is, it is not easy to write about the Middle East and not be a Middle
Eastern or be an outsider who never lives there. Another major point is even various cases in the
Middle East are not similar and it is not possible to generalize the theories and apply them to all
the different cases in the MENA region. what I realized during my research is that each of these
cases and countries carry a different and unique historical or contextual root of concepts. Also,
there are lots of local meanings and happenings that without knowing them the comparison of
cases might pose a challenge for comparison.
The other limitation which I faced and is common and well-known in the field of social
science regarding the Middle East is exceptionalism. Because studying the Middle East is not an
easy job for the scholars, both for traveling there or accessing the data and resources related to
the politics of the Middle East, this region is known as an exception which due to its uniqueness
does not fit into studies informed by conventional social science theories and perceptions. This
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issue would lead to another problem which is the disposition of the Middle Eastern scholars
against the theory. According to them studying Middle East is more explanatory and empiricist.
Although, in this research I tried to transform these limitations to opportunity, to contribute to
the literature as a person who is Middle Eastern and lived there for three decades.

9.2 Future Studies
By revisiting the previous related studies and studying the patterns of contemporary
social movements in the MENA region I learned that although specific combination of some
critical factors could be conducive to regime failure or success, but they are hardly able to
provide an all-inclusive map regarding all the factors and causes that could lead reformation in
the region. Moreover, just because a specific regime upholds its status quo during this wave of
chaos and riots, we cannot conclude that it is entirely a strong or stable regime. The fact is it
might not be vulnerable to the specific forms of mobilization that identified those revolts.
In my opinion, besides the determiners that I mentioned, there are some other impactful
factors that could affect the civil society, or the opposition groups should take into consideration.
These three strategies, I believe, can get the protestors closer to their demand and bring a more
prosperous outcome.
First, to strengthen the movement’s solidity and weaken the unity of the adversary, the
best possible tactic is the nonviolent one. However, at the same time they could use various
tactics based on the level risks, but it should be peaceful.
Second, the timing of the escalations should be chosen carefully. The protestors should
be aware that at the time of insufficient unity or momentum, escalation could be so risky. While
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an escalation with a proper timing could help a movement to experience a diverse group of
people with the highest number of participants.
Third, although a fruitful movement should be formed of people with the same demands
and concerns but a diversified group of protesters with the same demand could be more
successful in reaching their goals than a solid group of protesters.
Elaboration on the above strategies is necessary for the future studies. In addition, scholars may
validate the outcome model of this study based on more accurate data from the MENA region.
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